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A CHART FOR A CHARTER
Albert S. Abel*
Constitutional revision is not a dead issue. It is only sleeping. 
A worldwide economic crisis has diverted attention in Canada as 
elsewhere to other problems for the time being. The necessity for 
solutions has not disappeared however. It had just been adjourned. 
The days of grace must not be wasted. Prophecy is a hazardous oc­
cupation but the whole course of our history justifies a confident 
prediction that the need to devise a satisfactory frame of government 
persists. In 1841 the Union of the Canadas1, in 1867 the British 
North America Act2 were responses to contemporary frictions. The 
decade of the 1960’s saw a similar continuous frustrated groping.’ 
What has been going on for a century will continue to go on until 
either the sources of discontent are eliminated or the nation dis­
solves.
* A lbert S. Abel is a Professor of Law in the Faculty o f Law at the U niversity of 
T oronto. The text of this paper was delivered in an address to the Law S tudents' 
Society at the University o f New Brunswick on M arch 5, 1976.
1 M cA rthur, L ord Durham  and the Union o f  the Canadas in 4 S H O R T T  & 
D O U G H T Y , C A N A D A  A N D  IT S  P R O V IN C E S  (1913); S H O R T T , LO R D  
S Y D E N H A M  ch ap te rs  X III ,  X IV  (1908); W IT T K E , H IS T O R Y  O F 
C A N A D A  117 (1931).
2 Beauchesne, Events Which Led to C onfederation , 10 C A N . BAR REV. 101 
(1921).
3 The R eport of the T rem blay C om m ission on C onstitu tional Q uestions in 1956 set 
out in detail Q uebec’s unhappiness with existing constitu tional arrangem ents. 
The obsolescence o f the fiscal arrangem ents m ade in w artim e led to a 1962 report 
by the Royal C om m ission on G overnm ent O rganization  recom m ending an in­
creased role for the Federal-Provincial R elations Division in the federal D epart­
m ent o f Finance in connection with federal input to the Federal-Provincial C om ­
m ittee on Fiscal and Econom ic M atters , a continuing body which acted as 
secre tariat to the periodic Federal-Provincial Conferences. Friction between 
claim s of the two levels continued. In July 1967, Prim e M inister Pearson an­
nounced an intention to hold a constitu tional conference in early 1968, in 
N ovem ber 1967 at the invitation o f Prem ier R obarts the C onfederation for 
T om orrow  Conference was held in T oron to  and the provincial prem iers agreed 
that the tim e had com e for rem odelling the constitution. In February 1968 the 
first m eeting of the C onstitu tional Conference was held in O ttaw a. This was fol­
lowed at frequent intervals by o ther constitu tional conferences o f which some 
were in cam era. The seventh and final m eeting of the C onstitu tional Conference, 
June 14-16, 1971, resulted in the proposals known as the V ictoria C harter, which 
proved abortive. An account o f the later stages will be found in Special Joint 
C om m ittee on the C onstitution o f C anada, M inutes o f Proceedings and 
Evidence, May 28, 1970; Appendices A ,B ,C  set out the conclusions reached at 
the first three m eetings o f the C onstitu tional Conference.
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That latter must not happen. The final outcome, given the 
dimensions of the provinces, even the largest, would be either their 
formal absorption into the United States or more probably their sur­
vival as its feeble satellites.4 Canadians, Americans, and indeed the 
world at large would be the losers. It is as I see it important for all 
that this continent not become a monolith, that there be an alter­
native to the American culture whatever its merits. Unless we gel a 
more acceptable and a more serviceable constitution, that is bound 
to happen.
Preoccupation with immediacies marked the constitutional set­
tlements of 1841 and 1867 and the tentatives of the 1960’s. For that 
reason the former did not wear well and the latter would not have 
done so. We can leave to historians the shortcomings of 1841.' As for 
the 1867 Act, it is littered with spent provisions no longer of 
operational consequence.6 Some of it rests on timebound assump­
tions like that about treaty making which gives no government in 
Canada explicit authority to pass laws for carrying into effect a 
treaty to which Canada is a party.7 A very serious flaw is the over- 
specification of fields of competence to itemize currently sensitive 
particulars of the time, thus blurring the functional division of con­
cerns between provinces and Dominion.
The merely obsolete items could be ignored as irrelevant even 
though inelegant. They do not themselves justify constitutional revi­
sion but if that is undertaken they should be scrapped in the interest
4 Like ail the o ther present-day im perial powers, the U nited S tates has turned to 
the client-state device instead of territo rial expansion and classical colonialism , 
whose only clear post-W orld W ar I instance is M ussolini's E thiopian adventure. 
(The trend from  branching to franchising affords a curious analogy in business 
organization).
5 See W A IT E , T H E  L IF E  A N D  T IM E S  O F C O N F E D E R A T IO N , c.4 (1962).
6 O f the 147 sections in the original B .N .A . Act 1867, only 79 continue to have any 
currency, 64 are spent, repealed o r superseded by legislation contem plated by the 
Act itself and four are for practical purposes fu n c tu s o fficio  (e.g. sec. 6) (“ The 
Parts o f the Province of C anada (as it exists at the passing o f this A ct) which 
form erly constituted respectively the Provinces o f U pper C anada and Lower 
C an ad a  shall be deem ed to be severed, and shall form  two separate Provinces. 
The P art which form erly constituted the Province o f  U pper C anada shall con­
stitu te  the Province o f O ntario ; and the Part which formerly constitu ted  the 
Province o f Lower C anada shall constitu te  the Province of Q uebec” ) or obsoles­
cent, e.g. section 138 (“ From  and after the Union the Use of the W ords ‘U pper 
C a n ad a ' instead of ‘O n ta rio ’, o r ‘Lower C an ad a ' instead o f ‘Q uebec’ in any 
Deed, W rit, Process, Pleading, D ocum ent, M atte r o r Thing shall not invalidate 
the sam e” ).
7 Section 132 addresses itself exclusively to “ O bligations . . .  as P art o f the British 
Em pire . . . arising under T reaties between the Em pire and . . . Foreign 
C ountries" . For an early sta tem ent o f C a n ad a 's  position, see TO D D , 
P A R L IA M E N T A R Y  G O V E R N M E N T  IN T H E  B R IT IS H  C O L O N IE S  199- 
218 (1880).
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of tidying up the fundamental charter. What does make change 
imperative is the short-falls and overlaps traceable to preoccupation 
of the Fathers of Confederation with the issues of  the 1860’s. They 
were on the whole good statesmen but poor draftsmen. Unhappily a 
distant court totally unacquainted with either Canada or federal 
systems8 had for decades the last say as to what they had wrought.’ 
Parsing a basic instrument of government as it would a trust inden­
ture, that court warped the fabric of relations between governmental 
levels. In 1949 the Supreme Court of Canada did become the 
Supreme Court for C anada.10 Since then it has quietly repaired 
some of the damage." But, restrained as they are by a proper respect 
for precedent, courts cannot escape the influence of past decisions 
or ,12 which is bad, of past verbiage in which decisions were swaddled. 
Only a new text will free them from those residues, a text which 
while retaining the leading principles on which confederation was 
based used fresh phrases to avoid implied carryover of stale cliches 
of construction.
My object is to propose provisions for incorporation in such a 
text. 1 shall confine myself to matters touching the allocation of 
legislative competence between the central and the member govern­
8 See the rem arks o f Edw ard Blake in a letter to one British C olonial Secretary 
quoted in C annon S o m e  Data R ela ting  to the A ppeal to the Privy Council, 3 
C A N . BAR REV. 455 at 469 (1925).
9 N adan v. The K ing, (1926] A .C. 482, [1926] 2 D .L .R . 177, [1926] 1 W .W .R . 801; 
cf. Cushing  v. D upuy, 5 App. C as. 409 (1880); see 1 H O L D S W O R T H , 
H IS T O R Y  O F  E N G L IS H  LAW  522 (1922). It was not until the adoption of the 
S ta tu te  o f W estm inister 1931, 22 Geo. V, c. 4 (U .K .) th a t C anada was em ­
powered to elim inate appeals by leave, see British Coal Corp. v. The K ing , [1935] 
A .C . 500, [1935] 3 D .L .R . 401 and only in 1949 that she availed herself o f that 
right. The m eagre and inconclusive history o f judicial review would seem to in­
d icate that this was in accord with the con tem porary  intention, see S T R A Y E R , 
JU D IC IA L  R E V IEW  O F  L E G IS L A T IO N  IN  C A N A D A  15-18 (1968).
10 C an. S tats. 1949 (2d sess.), c.37, s.3. See Laskin, The Suprem e Court o f  Canada: 
The First H undred Years, 53 C A N . BAR REV. 459 (1975).
11 See S M IT H , T H E  C O M M E R C E  P O W E R  IN C A N A D A  A N D  T H E  
U N IT E D  ST A T E S, c.5 (1963); S T R A Y E R , JU D IC IA L  R E V IEW  O F  
L E G IS L A T IO N  IN C A N A D A  28 (1968); but cf. G ibson, — A n d  O ne S tep  
Backward: The Suprem e Court and C onstitu tional Law  in the S ix ties, 53 C A N . 
BAR REV. 621 (1975).
12 "A  stock of ju rid ica l conceptions and form ulas is developed, and we tak e  them , 
so to speak, ready m ade."  C A R D O Z O , T H E  N A T U R E  O F  T H E  JU D IC IA L  
P R O C E S S  47 (1921), and see id. 19-20; see also S T O N E , T H E  P R O V IN C E  
A N D  F U N C T IO N  O F  LA W  196 (1946); cf. I G E N Y , M E T H O D E  
D’IN T E R P R E T A T IO N  ET S O U R C E S  EN D R O IT  P R IV E  P O S IT IF  51 (2d 
ed. rev. 1954) ("S an s doute, dans sa mise en oeuvre, nous som m e dom inés, à 
no tre  insu, par l’au to rité  et la trad ition  et si je  puis dire par cette hérédité profes­
sionnelle, qui nous enveloppe et nous etrein t, com m e une sorte de tunique de Nes- 
sus” ); Livingston, A bo lition  o f  A ppeals fro m  Canadian Courts to  the Privy 
Council, 64 H A R V . L. REV. 104 at 111-112 (1950).
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ments. They do not exhaust the catalogue of useful revisions. Nor 
can 1 here deal exhaustively even with them. 1 hope sometime to 
range more widely and delve more deeply but for now must attempt 
a simple outline of an alternative formula dealing with this core 
question of federalism. Even that demands a comparison with the 
provisions, notably13 sections 91 and 92 of the British North America 
Act, which would be replaced. In that connection, some capsule 
comment on how existing provisions have worked and what changes 
and continuities may be anticipated under the alternative formula 
will be undertaken.
The permanent distinctive features of Canada have been her 
geography and her diverse societies. Ours is a vast land with a 
marginal location and a small population.
A political entity to play a part in the family of nations and, 
more important, to enjoy more than a mere subsistence economy 
needs a minimum critical mass. This both presumes and allows a 
common authority with the capacity to marshal human and material 
resources so that all contribute to and all share in the pool. The con­
centrations of private power consequent on our modern market 
economy can only be matched and mastered by political centers of 
comparable magnitude. Societies being like physical bodies subject 
to the laws of gravity, resistance to the pull exerted by a huge nearby 
mass depends on the exertion of a counterforce; the relevance of this 
for Canada is evident. Whether the united strength of C anada’s peo­
ple can suffice to meet the challenges of the other power structures, 
foreign or domestic, actual or potential, which circumstance our life 
has been doubted by some. In any event only such united strength 
would seem adequate. The minimum appropriate dimensions of 
federal power are determined by that consideration.
The imperatives of physical and economic geography tell in one 
direction, those of history and mores in another. The two solitudes 
label oversimplifies the reality it dramatizes. Besides Quebec’s, there 
are some four to ten, depending on how one looks at it, regions in 
Canada with their own cultures, their own patterns of life and values, 
even of speech. The assumption latent in much that has been said 
and done is that Canada is just Ontario writ large. That is wrong. 
Even a brief visit to Victoria and Corner Brook — and many places 
in between — would prove that. The world over, even national and in 
a still greater degree regional traits have been blurred. Canadians 
have not escaped. Yet they are by no means homogenized. Al'.hough 
even within provinces accepted ways of behaving and thinking differ
13 Sections 93, 94A, 95 and 96 to 101 inclusive would also be affected by the 
proposals m ade in this paper.
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among sections, the differences are smaller than in the country as a 
whole. The more a central authority undertakes to impose a com­
mon standard on the relations and conduct of individuals in the or­
dinary affairs of daily life, the more a sense of frustration with the in­
stitutions of government grows. To avoid endemic discontent, power 
over such matters must be dispersed amongst power centers having 
at least a rough correspondence with the diverse social milieux. That 
variety of regional social attitudes is a blessing to be preserved and 
promoted.
The disparity in material resources is on the other hand a curse. 
The 1867 Act tried to do something about it but with only ephemeral 
success because the static solutions proposed became obsolete over 
time.14 It has never ceased to inspire agitation and legislation.15 To 
urge a uniform income level throughout Canada would be 
chimerical. If one were realized it would more likely be a swamp 
than a plateau. But there can be no happy partnership between 
plutocrat and pauper. Depressed areas are a drain on the national 
vigour. Their elimination is a legitimate, even an imperative national 
concern.
These three sets of conditions — the need for consolidating a 
certain amount of power in order to command respect in the 
economic and the international systems complicated as it is by our 
large area and relatively small population, the distinctive sense of 
identity of the various regions, the uneven distribution of wealth — 
are the background factors to reckon with in structuring a workable 
division of functions between the provincial and the federal levels. 
Indeed that would appear to have been the basic premise of the 1867 
Act.16 But it was an inarticulate premise. A random listing of
14 N otably  by sections 118 and 119, the form er calling for annual lum p sum and per 
cap ita  paym ents o f fixed am ounts to  each confederating province, the latter es­
tablishing a supplem entary paym ent to New Brunswick for ten years. Lapse o f 
tim e put an end to 119. A revised schedule o f paym ents to  the provinces was sub­
stituted in 1907 for that o f 118 and the whole arrangem ent was repealed in 1950, 
16 G eo. VI, c.6 (U .K .) and a different arrangem ent o f financial subventions to 
the provinces o f m ore flexible character substituted. On the significance o f the 
financial arrangem ents as an inducem ent to C onfederation , see W allace, A lbert 
S m ith , C onfederation and R eaction  in N ew  Brunsw ick I852-ISS2 , 44 C A N . 
H IS T . REV. 285 (1963).
15 See M A L L O R Y , T H E  S T R U C T U R E  O F C A N A D IA N  G O V E R N M E N T  
358-359 (1971).
16 The “ T oron to  School” o f historians has stressed the views o f U pper C anadians 
active in the m ovem ent for C onfederation  which looked to a powerful central 
governm ent and rather insignificant provincial fields o f com petence. See 
C A R E L E S S , C A N A D A : A S T O R Y  O F C H A L L E N G E , p. 255 (1953); 
M A R T IN , F O U N D A T IO N S  O F  C A N A D IA N  N A T IO N H O O D , p. 339 
(1955). Q uebec w riters take  a different view, see 2 G R O U L X , H 1ST O IR E  DU
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minutiae misled later generations into approaching that Act not as a 
system but as a mere heap of items. Like it, what 1 would propose 
grounds itself on those three factors; it tries to bring into clearer 
relief their importance as the shaping principles of our national con­
sensus.17
How the proposed and the existing schemes relate to those con­
ditioning circumstances and to each other will be examined after a 
statement of the content of the former. The terms of the British 
North America Act about federal and provincial legislative powers 
respectively presumably are already familiar enough to my audience.
This then is suggested as a successor to section 9 1:1*
P arliam ent may m ake laws about




c. transporta tion  and com m unication facilities and services o f substan­
tial significance to m ore than one province.
d. labour, cap ital and com m odity transactions having substantial ef­
fects on their respective m arkets in m ore than  one province
e. industrial and intellectual property.
CA N A D A  FR A N Ç A IS  283-289 (1960); 2 R A PPO R T  DE LA C O M M ISSIO N  
ROY AL D’EN Q U ET E  SU R  LES PR O B LEM ES C O N ST IT U T IO N N E L S  
(Com m ission T rem blay) 152-156 (1956). T hat the la tter m ore clearly reflects con­
tem porary  sentim ent is evidenced by a letter from A rthur G ordon to Edward 
C ardw ell, written im m ediately following the C harlo ttetw on C onference, in which 
he notes the wish o! the C anadian  delegates that "all general legislation should be 
dealt with by, and all undefined powers o f legislation reside in, a central 
Legislature . . . whilst the local assem blies were to  be allowed to  sink to the posi­
tion o f m ere m unicipalities” , which wish he shared but noted that they did not 
“ harm onize with the in terp re ta tion” in the M artim es or by Lower C anadians, 
who wanted “ the preservation o f the existing Legislatures^) a central Parliam ent 
to which the consideration o f som e few topics o f general interest are to  be con­
fided under vigorous restrain ts, prom pted by a jealous care for the m aintenance 
o f Provincial independence” , quoted in 38 C A N . H IS T . REV. 108-9 (1967).
17 " I l  faudra cette fois, au lieu d ’agir au petit bonheur, prendre le tem ps de réfléchir 
et de concevoir un régim e fédéral valable dans lequel les régions sauront quels 
sont leurs droits et obligations et dans lequel l’E tat federal sera non pas faible, 
m ais fort . . .”  Jean Rey, La vie politique  R EV U E DES D EU X  M O N D E S , 
Nov. 1975, p. 309. The rem ark , m ade in reference to  Belgium, is equally  ap­
plicable to C anada.
18 Except for sec. 91(24) “ Indians and lands reserved for the Indians” . W hich is the 
proper level o f governm ent to deal with this would seem to be a m atter as to 
which the wishes o f the Indians (and the Innuit) themselves, if they can be ascer­
tained, would seem to deserve perhaps not controlling but certainly substantial 
weight.
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2. Abuses o f the natural environm ent having substantial consequences in 
m ore than  one pronince.
3. E xternal affairs including the enforcem ent o f the provisions o f treaties 
m ade under section ( ).
4. T he raising o f money by any m ode or system  of taxation.
5. Subject to  the provisions o f this C onstitu tion , the organization and 
operations o f the federal governm ent.
6. Except as provided by section ( ), the public debt and property.
7. T he governm ent o f areas within C anada lying outside the boundaries 
o f any province and o f the N ational C apital T erritory  as defined in 
Schedule ( ).
8. Defense against war or insurrection.
To complete the statement of Parliament’s powers would be ad­
ded the following two new sections:
The power to m ake treaties is federal. It is co-extensive with the power of 
P arliam ent to legislate under (the preceding) section.
Federal moneys m ay be used for carrying out laws in relation to  the 
powers granted to or recognized in the federal governm ent by section ( ) 
and otherw ise only as directed by the C anadian  Economic Council except 
with the unanim ous concurrence o f the Provinces.
Section 92’s replacement would read as follows:
Each provincial legislature may m ake laws operative within the Province 
as to anything not assigned by Section ( ) to  Parliam ent as qualified by 
Section ( ). This power extends but is not lim ited to laws dealing with
1. The constitution o f the Province.
2. M unicipal and local authorities.
3. The raising o f money by any m ode or system of taxation.
4. Civil and crim inal law and procedure without prejudice to the power 
o f Parliam ent to provide for carrying out m easures enacted in the exer­
cise o f powers given it by this C onstitu tion .
Finally, an additional section to specify the relation between 
federal and provincial laws would read:
Federal laws are param ount except tha t as regards m atters specified un­
der subsection (1) paragraphs (c) and (d) and under subsection (2), o f sec­
tion ( ) ,  if all relevant provinces have parallel provisions, the provincial law 
shall apply.
The marked change in language is deliberate. The object is to let 
and even make Canadian judges apply Canadian fundamental law to 
fit the Canadian setting without deference or indeed much reference 
to former utterances.
Yet the changes obviously go far beyond the merely verbal. I 
believe and hope to show that what is retained exceeds what is 
revamped. In large part a re-affirmation amounting on occasion to a 
revival o f  1867’s substance is sought. That attempt at revival, 
however, undeniably entails changing some things that were written 
into that Act and more that have been read into it. It extends both to 
details and to the general scheme.
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The global pattern is brought into sharper relief in three main 
respects.
One gives express though qualified content to the paramountcy 
principle. When federal enactments and independently valid acts of 
the members overlap, other federal constitutions direct that the lat­
ter must give way.'9 That result, broadly essential to a functioning 
federalism, is reached here too but as a result of judicial construc­
tion20 rather than clear text.21 One of the new sections makes it ex­
plicit but adds flexibility not present in the all-or-nothing version 
current both in Canada and elsewhere. For those cases where the ex­
istence of federal competence is expressly conditioned on a problem 
affecting more than one province, a consensus of the provinces af­
fected would have overriding effect. For this to happen, all of those 
affected must agree. Parallel action by some but not all affected 
provinces would not do. Since the qualification does not refer to the 
clause about external affairs, federal legislation bearing on inter­
national aspects would always govern. Identification of the relevant 
provinces and correlation of their acts with federal enactments can 
still raise questions calling for judicial settlement. They should be no 
more troublesome than those now present about the fuzzy contours
19 See. e.g., C O M M O N W E A L T H  O F  A U S T R A L IA  C O N S T IT U T IO N  A CT, 
sec. 109; BASIC LAW  O F T H E  FE D E R A L  R E P U B L IC  O F  G E R M A N Y , 
A rt. 31; C O N S T IT U T IO N  O F  IN D IA , A rt. 251; C O N S T IT U C IO N  
P O L IT IC A  DE LOS E ST A D O S U N ID O S  M E X IC A N O S , A rt. 133; U .S . 
C O N S T IT U T IO N , A rt. VI, c.2.
20 “ (A lthough) the British N orth  A m erica Act contains no provisions declaring that 
the legislation o f the Dom inion shall be suprem e, as is the case in the constitution 
o f the United S tates, the sam e principle is necessarily implied in our C on­
stitu tional Act, and is to be applied whenever, in the m any cases which may arise, 
the federal and provincial legislatures adopt the sam e m eans to carry into effect 
d istinct powers.” H udson  v. S ou th  N orw ich , 24 S .C .R . 143 at 149 (1895) (per 
S trong, C .J.); see A .G . Can. v. A .G . B .C ., [1930] A .C. I l l  at 118.
21 The Quebec Resolutions did provide, "45. In regard to all subjects over which 
jurisdiction belongs to both the G eneral and Local Legislatures, the laws o f the 
G eneral Parliam ent shall control and supersede those m ade by the local 
Legislature, and the la tte r shall be void so far as they are  repugnant to, or incon­
sistent with the fo rm er.”  During the unrecorded discussions in London with 
Colonial Office officials leading up to the introduction o f the British N orth  
A m erica Act, it d isappeared except for a truncated  retention in connection with 
agriculture and im m igration which had under the Q uebec Resolutions been 
federal but which becam e concurrent powers but with the qualification tha t “ any 
Law o f the Legislature o f a Province . . .  shall have e f fe c t . . .  as long as and as far 
only as it is not repugnant to any Act o f the Parliam ent of C an ad a” . A curious 
clause of the British N orth  A m erica Act 1964, 12-13 Eliz. II, c.73 (U .K .) 
granting Parliam ent power to legislate old age pensions, etc., provides that “ no 
such law shall affect the operation o f any law present o r future o f a provincial 
legislature in relation to  any such m a tte r”  thus reversing the usual operation  o f 
param ountcy in the special context.
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of paramountcy.22 In recognizing the general principle of federal 
supremacy, the proposal is for the most part a codification of es­
tablished doctrine.
That is not so of another primary feature. The substitute for 
section 92 would clearly give residuary power to the provinces and 
limit federal authority to what is expressly stated. The 1867 Act is 
equivocal about residuary power.23 A former judicial tendency to at­
tribute it to the federal domain24 seems no longer to command as­
sent.25 Instead section 91’s “ peace, order and good government of 
C anada” formula and section 92(16) are read together to bifurcate 
it. The arrangement is almost unique. Most federal constitutions 
place it all in one or the other level. Ideally the Canadian type which 
looks to the relative weight of truly national and of more local con­
cerns is ideal. In practice it requires a sublety of evaluation that may 
have been unreasonable to expect and that certainly was not 
forthcoming.26 This it is that leads to the suggestion of resort to the 
workable though worse precedents elsewhere of picking a single 
recipient.
Why choose the provinces instead of the Dominion? That ques­
tion goes to the very heart of the problem as to the kind of political
22 The problem  is not as to the consequences when param ountcy  applies — it sus­
pends the operation  o f provincial sta tu tes without invalidating or annulling them  
—  but as to the situations where it applies, a question o f the nature o f the 
relationship between the operative term s of the m easures. See Laskin, O ccupying  
The Field; P aram ountcy in Penal Legislation , 41 C A N . BAR REV . 234 (1963); 
Lederm an, The Concurrent Operation o f  Federal and Provincial Laws in 
Canada , 9 M cGill L .J. 185 (1962-3).
23 A resolution for expressly giving residual powers to  the provinces was rejected in 
the Quebec C onference, see C R E IG H T O N , JO H N  A. M A C D O N A L D , T H E  
Y O U N G  P O L IT IC IA N  378-380 (1952) but the Conference refrained from  mov­
ing to sta te  them  as belonging to the D om inion, so th a t the m atter was left dangl­
ing.
24 See R e In itia tive and R eferendum  A ct, [1919] A. C. 935, 48 D .L .R . 18, [1919] 3
W .W .R . I; Fort Frances Pulp & Paper Co. L td. v. M anitoba Free Press Co. 
Ltd ., [1923] A C. 695 at 705, [1923] 3 D .L .R . 629 at (dictum ); cf. R e  Regulation  
and C ontrol o f  R adio  C om m unication  in C anada , [1932] A .C. 304, [1932] 2 
D .L .R . 81, [1932] I W .W .R . 563 (sem b le); see also, O ’C onnor, R eport to the 
Senate o f  Canada on the B .N .A . A c t, annex 1, pp. 60, 61 (1939).
25 “ H ead 16 contains w hat may be called the residuary power o f the Province” . 
Reference re Farm  P roducts M arketing A ct, [1957] S .C .R . 198, 7 D .L .R .2d 257 
(per R and, J.). See R eport, Special Jo in t C om m ittee on the C onstitu tion  o f 
C anada, c. 18 (1972); but see D A W SO N , T H E  G O V E R N M E N T  O F  C A N A D A  
(4th ed, W ard) 89-91 (1970). Cf. The K ing v. Sha rkey , 79 C .L .R . 121 (1949) dis­
cussing the lim its on the application o f an identical phrase in the A ustralian  C on­
stitution; note especially the observations o f L atham , C .J . at pp. 137, 138.
26 See Abel, W hat Peace. Order and G ood Governm ent?, 7 W E S T E R N  O N ­
T A R IO  L. REV. 1 (1968).
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association not simply that we should have but that we can maintain. 
Notions about what should be often only reflect unanalyzed emo­
tions — fears of size, of remoteness, greater trust in one’s near 
neighbours than in “ those others” . But, though these may have in­
fluenced my choice unwittingly, its conscious aim is to give each level 
of government powers adequate but not excessive for satisfying the 
essential conditions of living together. These, to repeat, are an effec­
tive presence in the economic and international arenas, a regional 
diversity of life styles, and adjustments to correct the uneven dis­
tribution of material resources. The last entails the creation of whol­
ly new mechanisms. I have developed a plan for one, exposition of 
which must await another occasion but which is congenial to provin­
cial residuary power. The first two essential conditions are not mere­
ly consistent with, they are dependent on that allocation. The phrase 
“ peace, order and good government” disappears with its deceptively 
alluring ambiguity. The powers specified for the federal government 
include, however, most areas where it was given any effect27 and 
some where its application is problematic.28 They cover the manage­
ment of the economy and of external relations comprehensively and 
more clearly than is now the case. All else is left to the provinces. 
Theirs is the determination of policies for C anada’s plural societies, 
the sociologist’s Canada, as contrasted with polices for Canada as a 
market, the economist’s Canada.
What is envisaged basically resembles the European Common 
Market as contemplated by its founders plus attributes incident to 
international personality. A weaker federal government could not 
deal with the related national needs. A stronger one would threaten 
diversity of cultures and thereby hazard either the breakup of the 
confederation or high-handed imposition of unshared values on a 
sullen population. The possession of power seems always to invite its 
exercise and tempt its extension. A central government should have 
just enough to face up to independent power centres external to the 
political system. To permit continuing co-existence of central and 
member spheres of competence, residual power must be dispersed. If 
concentrated, its holder winds up the monopolist of public policy, 
whose implementation has always finally spawned authoritarian 
regimes. Even giving the residuary power to the members has not 
guaranteed their vitality.29 But to bestow it on the central govern­
ment would foredoom them.
U.N.B. L A W  J O U R N A L  29
27 For a resum é of the principal areas o f application, see L A S K IN ’S C A N A D IA N  
C O N S T IT U T IO N A L  LAW  191 (4th ed. rev. Abel) (1975).
28 See Interprovincial Co-operatives Ltd. v. The Queen. 53 D .L .R . 3d 321 (1975), 
(S .C .C .).
29 “ T here are today, few, if any, governm ental functions perform ed by the states 
that are  not subject either to the direct control o f the national governm ent or to
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Along with precise formulations for paramountcy and residuary 
power, a third major structural innovation is the systematic grouping 
of itemized powers. There was, I have argued elsewhere,30 a pattern 
hidden in the arrays of 91 and 92. The initial obscuring clutter was 
aggravated by the erosion of original connotations as they were rub­
bed down by stare decisis. 31 The classes of subjects have been seen 
not as the family groups they are but as isolates.32 The placement in 
91 of a few whose closer kinship was with 92’s members facilitated 
such a disjunctive reading. The nominate spheres of  control are re­
arranged under my proposal to eliminate static. They are focussed to 
emphasize how they team together toward the goals set by the con­
ditioning circumstances of  the Canadian scene. Thus recast, they in­
vite application as a set, not as rivals.
Given these parameters of purpose and general structure, what 
functions are appropriately federal and what ones appropriately 
provincial? That question calls for an examination of the particulars, 
present and projected. Perforce perfunctory, it still should indicate 
how the changes would bear on existing law.
Most of the powers proposed for Parliament are specified and 
in terms special to it. Fewer of the provincial list are. Their having 
the residuary power dispenses with much elaboration.33 With still
the possibility of pre-em ption by the national governm ent. The concept o f 
separa te  sovereignties within this country is largely a m atter o f h isto ry” . K urland, 
The Suprem e Court 1963 T erm , 78 H A R V . L. REV. 143, 163 (1964); accord. 
Sou th  Carolina  v. K atzenbach , 383 U .S . 301, 358, 15 L.ed. 2d 769, 804, 86 S .C t. 
803 (per Black, J. dissenting). The com m erce clause and the due process clause 
between them  have alm ost to tally  eclipsed the Tenth A m endm ent. O f the m any re­
cent decisions that could be cited, I m ention only Fry v. U .S .. 44 L.ed 363, 95
S .C t. 1975 (state em ployees’ salaries subject to federal legislation); Perkins v. 
M atthew s , 400 U .S. 379, 27 L.ed. 476. 91 S .C t. 431 (extension o f m unicipal boun­
dary). See also text and note 83.
30 See Abel, The N eglected  Logic o f  91 and 92, 19 U. o f T .L .J . a t pp. 499-506 
(1969).
31 S T R A Y E R , JU D IC IA L  R E V IEW  O F  L E G IS L A T IO N  IN C A N A D A  155- 
156 (1968).
32 The approach has been pervasive. Its full effect can be appreciated only by an ex­
am ination  o f the com plete pattern  o f constitu tional decision but is illustrated by 
the technique o f analysis in, e.g.. R eference re Validity o f  Section  5(a) o f  the 
Dairy Industry  A c t, [1949] S .C .R . I, [1949] 1 D .L .R . 433 and R eference re 
A lberta  S ta tu tes , [1938] S .C .R . 100, [1938] 2 D .L .R . 81.
33 The U nited S ta tes C onstitu tion  specifies no sta te  powers at all, its only reference 
to them being lim itations on their exercise im posed by A rticle 1, section 10. The 
residuary power was assum ed to be with the states w ithout express m ention in the 
original C onstitu tion , being inserted by the Tenth A m endm ent, ‘‘The powers not 
delegated to  the U nited S tates by the C onstitu tion , nor prohibited  by it to  the 
States, are reserved to  the states respectively, or to  the people." This A m endm ent
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others added, virtually all those now existing continue to exist. Con­
sideration of their fate is postponed for the moment in favour of a t­
tention to two items as to which comparable authority is given both 
levels.
For one, “ The raising of money by any mode or system of tax­
ation” , the language of 91(3) has been borrowed.
The federal taxing power is in itself unaltered.34 It may well be 
exercised differently because the conjoint operation of successor 
91(6)35 and the new section to which it refers channel significant parts 
of federal tax revenue to provincial treasuries. Flowever, Parliament 
remains as free to tax as ever.36 It must be to play its role as monitor 
of the economy.37 Post-Keynsian thought has clearly accepted fiscal
was not regarded, however, as doing m ore than  was im plicit in the original, see 5 
W R IT IN G S  O F  JA M E S  M A D ISO N  (ed. H unt) 387-388 (1904) (speech on in­
troducing the m otion for the first ten am endm ents).
34 For a som ew hat dated discussion o f its scope, see M acD onald , Taxation Powers 
in C anada , 19 C A N . BAR REV. 75 ( 1941 ). Q uestions would still rem ain whether 
a m easure in form  o f a tax was really such or was a disguised regulation. C om ­
pare In re Insurance A c t o f  Canada, [1932] A .C. 41, [1932] 1 D .L .R . 97, [1931 ] 3 
W .W .R . 689 with Readers Digest Assoc. ( C anada) L td. v. A .G . Can. (1965), 59 
D .L .R . 2d 54, with it being sustained if the form er and, if the la tter, when, but 
only when, the regulatory power exercised is independently possessed by the 
Dom inion, see A .G . B.C. v. A .G . Can., [1924] A .C. 222, [1923] 4 D .L .R . 669, 
[1923] 3 W .W .R . 1249.
35 The m atter to which this provision addresses itself m ight have been left, com ­
parably with w hat is proposed with reference to  the provinces, see infra, notes 58, 
59, to fall within the coverage o f the subsection im m ediately preceding, were it not 
for the need to  m ake explicit the lim itation on the use of public property, a lim ita­
tion which would not have a provincial parallel.
36 T hat freedom , as well as that o f the provinces, is lim ited by section 125 which 
provides that “ N o Lands or P roperty belonging to C anada or any Province shall 
be liable to T axation” . N o change in that respect is proposed. W hile a province 
may authorize taxation o f property  it or its agencies own, see R e Taxation o f  
U niversity o f  M anitoba Lands, [1940] 1 D .L .R . 579, [1940] 1 W .W .R . 145, and 
while the im m unity may be waived or may be withheld from  Crow n corporations, 
cf. A S H L E Y  & S M A IL S , C A N A D IA N  C R O W N  C O R P O R A T IO N S  16 
(1965), the A m erican doctrine allowing one state to tax an o th er’s property, see 
Kansas ex rel. Taggart v. H olcom be, 85 Kon. 178, 116 p. 251, is excluded, wisely 
it is subm itted.
37 “ Dans un systèm e caractérisé par l’instabilité économ ique le gouvernem ent 
fédéral ne peut plus considérer la taxation uniquem ent com m e une source de 
revenus; elle devient avant tou t un instrum ent de contrôle économ ique en vue de 
la stabilité. Dans un pays qui veut éviter l’inflation et les crises, elle est un moyen 
indispensable, car elle contribue très efficacem ent à décourager ou à stim uler 
l'activ ité du secteur privé . . .  si la population canadienne désire que son économ ie 
dém eure aussi libre que possible, il faut que le gouvernem ent fédéral, en assu­
m ant un rôle prédom inant dans la lutte contra l’instabilité économ ique retienne 
tous les pouvoirs de taxation  que lui reconnaît présentem ent la constitu tion .” 
L A M O N T A G N E , LE F E D E R A L IS M E  C A N A D IE N  255 (1954); accord.
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policy as a critical component in the control o f  economic ac tiv ity /8
Provincial power, however, would shed the condition that taxes 
be direct.”  Some detours around that stumbling block have indeed 
been allowed40 but other provincial revenue measures have tripped 
over it.41 With the terms of section 121 left untouched,42 nothing of 
value seems lost by elimination of the directness requirement.43 As 
for the other main limitation on provincial taxing, that it be “ within
O N T .  A D V I S O R Y  C O M M I T T E E  O N  C O N F E D E R A T I O N ,  
B A C K G R O U N D  P A P E R S  A N D  R E P O R T S  307 (accepting as a “ basic 
postu la te” “ the continuing need for the retention of effective fiscal power by the 
federal governm ent, in o rder that such powers be available to prom ote stability , 
grow th and o ther national econom ic objectives” ) (1967).
38 M E A D E , T H E  C O N T R O L L E D  E C O N O M Y , c .X X III (1971); R O L L , T H E  
W O R L D  A F T E R  K E Y N E S  68-71 (1968); but cf. G A L B R A IT H , A M E R IC A N  
C A P IT A L IS M  83 (1952).
39 B .N .A . A ct, sec. 92(1). The criteria  o f directness or indirectness are  John S tu art 
Mill shiftability, C olton  v. The King. [1914] A .C . 176, 15 D .L .R  283, 5 W .W .R . 
662; see Bank o f  T oronto  v. Lam be. 12 App. Cas. 575 (1887) plus history, H alifax  
_v. E state o f  Fairbanks. [1928] A .C. 117, [1927] 4 D .L .R . 945, [1927] 3 W .W .R . 
493. This differs from the line draw n under the U nited S tates C onstitu tion , see 
H ylton  v. U .S.. 3 U .S . 171 (1796), where the term  “d irec t”  is also used in connec­
tion with taxation . A rt. I, sec. 9, cl.4, but for a different purpose than  in C anada. 
There is no sim ilar constrain t on either the sta tes or the C om m onw ealth  under the 
A ustralian  C onstitu tion .
40 See, e.g. A .G . B.C. v. K ingcom e N avigation  Co.. [1934] A .C  45. [1934] 1 D .L .R . 
31, [1933] 3 W .W .R . 353; A tlan tic  S m o k e  Shops Ltd. v. Conlon. [1943] A .C . 550, 
[1943] 4 D .L .R . 81, [1943] 3 W .W .R . 113.
41 See, e.g. Low er M ainland Dairy Products Sales A d ju s tm en t C om m ittee  v. 
C rystal Dairy L td ., [1933] A .C. 168, [1933] 1 D .L R. 82, [1932] 3 W .W .R . 639; 
Provincial Treasurer o f  A lberta  v. K err , [1933] A.C. 710, [1933] 4 D .L .R . 81, 
[1933] 3 W .W .R . 38.
42 The section calling for the adm ission " fre e” into each province o f “ A rticles o f the 
G row th, Produce or M anufac ture” o f o ther Provinces is aim ed at preventing in­
ternal trade  barriers. Its proscription is not lim ited to taxation  nor indeed to 
provincial legislation, see M urphy  v. C .P .R ., [1958] S .C .R . 626, 15 D .L .R . 2d 
145, but so far as the la tter is concerned, the D om inion 's " tra d e  and com m erce” 
power is sufficient to  prevent such action w ithout invoking section 121, see A .G . 
M anitoba  v. M anitoba Egg and Poultry A ssoc ., [1971] S .C .R . 689, 19 D .L .R . 
[3d) 169, [1971] 4 W .W .R . 705 and the successor pow er in the proposed draft 
should be equally effective, unless indeed the exporting and im porting provinces 
concurred  on a barrier, in exercise o f their overriding param ountcy  grant. It 
would seem advisable however to retain  it both to exclude that as a legitim ate 
m atter for provincial concurrence and also to  exclude federal interprovincial bar­
riers.
43 A rticles 98 and 99 of the Econom ic C om m unity  T reaty  speak of "tu rnover taxes, 
excise duties and o ther form s of indirect tax a tio n ” but in a context o f authorizing 
the Com m ission and the Council to take steps against m em ber sta tes erecting 
hurdles to trade exchanges am ongst them selves, see M A T H IJS E N , A G U ID E  
T O  E U R O P E A N  C O M M U N IT Y  LAW  105 (1972) such as are here already 
fully outlaw ed by Section 121.
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the Province” , the introductory sentence of new 92, authorizing 
provincial legislation “ operative within the province” preserves its 
general content. It gives some leeway for re-examination of the older 
authorities44 depending on what effect the courts see fit to give the 
word “ operative” . “ In order to the raising of a revenue for Provin­
cial purposes” has been invoked seldom and then unhappily.45 There 
is little reason for depriving provinces of taxation as a form of 
regulatory device.46
Also, both Parliament and the provinces are given authority 
with respect to the organs of government at their respective levels.
Curiously the 1867 Act47 gave Parliament no general power4" to 
provide or prescribe machinery of government at the federal level. A
44 Thus, with operation  rather than location as the touchstone, the courts could take 
a fresh look at the legitim acy of death duties unem barrassed  by the intricate and 
artificial rules attem pting  to assign a "s itu s” to  intangibles, illustrated by the 
authorities referred to in L A S K IN 'S , C A N A D IA N  C O N S T IT U T IO N A L  
LAW  (4th ed. rev. Abel 1975), c.X , sec. 4.
45 See R ussell v. The Queen, 7 App. C as. 829 at 837 (1882) (“ The Act in question is 
not a fiscal law; it is not a law for raising revenue; on the con trary , the effect of it 
m ay be to dim inish o r destroy revenue . . .” ) The observation was m ade in con­
nection not with 92(2) but with the identical phrase in 92(9).
46 Revenue-raising purpose and whether a m easure is a “ tax "  are  obviously related. 
If intended revenue production is an essential ingredient o f a “ tax ” , a substantive 
test, taxing power cannot support an enactm ent which aim s to discourage rather 
than  to  p rom ote revenue-enhancing activity. If the device o f im posing a 
pecuniary exaction on designated circum stances or events, a form al test, is 
critical, taxing power would allow its use regardless o f its objective. The much 
quoted but essentially em pty a ttem pt at definition by Duff, C .J. in Lawson  v. 
In terior Tree, Fruit and Vegetable C om m ittee , [1931] S .C .R . 357, [1931] 2 
D .L .R . 193 gives no guidance; the trea tm en t o f the forest protection fund levy on 
tim berland owners in A .G . B.C. v. E squim alt & N ana im o  R y .,  [1950] A .C . 87, 
[1950] I D .L .R . 305, [1949] 2 W .W .R . 1233 as a tax because “ im posed com ­
pulsorily by the S ta te  and recoverable at the suit o f the C row n” seem to reflect 
the form al test; and the m aterials cited, supra  n.34 in discussing federal taxation 
speak variously. A reconciling view would be to trea t it as a device, i.e. to use the 
form al test, but to require that if used for o ther than revenue raising, i.e. for 
regulatory purposes, the regulation m ust be one which it would be com petent for 
the enacting legislature to undertake by o ther means.
47 Som e assum ption o f the existence o f such a power may be deducted from sec. 
91(1) added by British N orth  A m erica  (N o. 2) A c t 1949, 13 Geo. VI, c.81 (U .K .) 
giving as a P arliam entary  class o f subjects “ The am endm ent from tim e to tim e of 
the C onstitu tion  o f  C a n ad a” , with several exceptions. O ne of them  dealing with 
the d u ra tion  o f Parliam ent might support such an assum ption were it not that it 
merely qualifies an express provision, sec. 50, to allow its relaxation by P arlia­
ment.
48 Several enum erated  classes o f subjects deal with special aspects, notably “ (4). 
The borrow ing of M oney on the Public C redit; (5) Postal Service; (8) The fixing 
o f and providing for the Salaries and Allowances o f Civil and o ther officers o f the 
G overnm ent o f C anada; (28) T he E stablishm ent, M aintenance and M anagem ent
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recent dictum has found the requisite basis in “ peace, order and good 
government” .49 New 91(5) would make it explicit, but “ subject to the 
provisions of this constitution” . That would mean that the judiciary 
and the Canadian Equalization Council had their positions50 con­
stitutionally assured by the special sections dealing with them. More 
generally, it would forestall reliance on this clause to ride roughshod 
over the elsewhere assigned limits on federal authority. There is 
much sentiment for a constitutional bill of rights.51 If confined as 
that of the United States long was52 to curbs on federal action, that is 
a legitimate and may be a desirable addition. If included, it might, 
without the qualification, be misread as vulnerable to statutes con­
cerning the “ operations of the federal government” .
The companion grant to the provinces of power to enact laws 
dealing with “ the constitution of the province” incorporates the gist
of P enitentiaries” and so much of (7) as speaks o f “ the M ilitia and M ilitary and 
N aval Service.” Sec. 101, the establishm ent o f a federal court system  does too. 
This might also be said o f “ (6) The Census and S ta tistics” , a “ double class o f 
subjects” th a t has a ttrac ted  little attention . “ S tatistics” as an independent grant 
was even com pletely overlooked by Lord H aldane in his opinion in the Board o f  
C om m erce Case where he m entioned it as som ething that "m ay  well be” within 
Parliam ent’s power as ancillary to “ trade and com m erce” , [1922] 1 A .C . at p. 
296. “ The C ensus” would seem to be som ething that the G overnor G eneral vir- 
tute o fficii could undertake and indeed th a t probably even now a L ieutenant 
G overnor could concern him self with, doubtless w ithout any power to com pel 
answ ers except as bestowed by a constitu tional sta tue, cf. K elly  v. M athers, 25 
M an. R. 580 (1916) — a ra th er inconsequential lim itation since census responses 
are  usually voluntary. T here is an assum ption though not a bestowal o f 
Parliam entary  power in Sec. 131 (“ U ntil the Parliam ent o f C anada otherwise 
provides the G overnor G eneral in Council m ay from  tim e to tim e appoint such of­
ficers as the G overnor G eneral in C ouncil deem s necessary or proper for the effec­
tual Execution o f this A ct” ).
49 See Jones  v. A G .  C an., 7 N .B .R . 526, 534 (1974).
50 Provision for these would be m ade in detail in separate sections whose term s fall 
outside the scope o f the present discussion.
51 See, e.g. C anad ian  C onstitu tional C ha rte r, V ictoria 1971, A rts. 1-4; R E P O R T  
O F  T H E  S P E C IA L  JO IN T  C O M M IT T E E  O N  T H E  C O N S T IT U T IO N  O F  
C A N A D A , c.9 (1972); but cf. C H E F F IN S  & T U C K E R , T H E  C O N ­
S T IT U T IO N A L  P R O C E S S  IN C A N A D A  103 (2d ed. 1976).
52 The classic announcem ent o f this doctrine by C hief Justice M arshall in Barron  v. 
B altim ore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833) continued for over a century  to  be accepted as a 
basic prem ise, see Palko v. C onnecticut, 302 U .S. 319, 58 S .C t. 149, 82 L.ed. 188
(1937). By its in terpretation  o f the due process and equal protection clauses o f the 
Fourteenth A m endm ent, however, the Suprem e C ourt has engaged in a process 
o f a ttrition  which has practically  d rained it o f substance, cf. Brennan, The 
S u prem e C ourt and the M eiklejohn In terpreta tion , 79 H A R V . L. REV . 3 (1965), 
although continuing to profess adherence at least to  the view that there has not 
been a to tal “ inco rpora tion” o f the first ten A m endm ents as a lim itation on state 
action , see A n n o t.,  18 L.ed. 2d 1388 (1968).
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of the present 92(1).53 But it does more. It drops the exception about 
“ the Office of Lieutenant Governor” . The one notable use of that ex­
ception has been to scuttle popular participation in the legislative 
process.54 Whether anyone may legislate about that office is a bit of a 
puzzle.55 Scrapping the limitation would dispell the obscurity. More 
significantly, it would erase a symbol of federal hegemony.56 The 
broad language proposed would moreover incorporate the substance 
of several other “ classes of subjects” now set out in section 92 and 
dispense with their separate mention. This applies to Heads 357, 45\  
559 and 660, to Head 761 insofar as the institutions there spoken of are 
publicly supported, and to everything in present 92 (14) except 
“ procedure in Civil M atters” which another rubric would leave with 
the provinces. As regards the judicial branch, with which 92 (14) 
deals, provincial competence would even be enlarged because no 
longer hobbled by section 96. That section literally goes only to who 
shall appoint judges. By extrapolation,62 it has resulted in fettering
53 An assurance to the provinces o f a “ representative” , a “ p arliam en tary” or 
w hatever basic type o f governm ent m ight be desired could be inserted as a 
separate provision in the constitu tion  in much the sam e m anner as the U .S . C on­
stitution guarantees to the sta tes a “ Republican Form  o f  G overnm ent” , A rt. IV, 
sec. 4. At present the m aintenance of a parliam entary  form  o f  governm ent may 
be im plicit in the unam endable provision as to the lieutenant governor.
54 See R eference re In itia tive and R eferendum  A c t, [1919] A .C. 935, 48 D .L .R . 18.
55 Cf. L A S K IN 'S  C O N S T IT U T IO N A L  LAW  (4th ed. rev. Abel) 95 (1975). Since 
“ there has never been any m ovem ent for reform  o f the office", SA Y W E LL , 
T H E  O F F IC E  O F  L IE U T E N A N T  G O V E R N O R  262 (1957), no answer has 
been given in default o f a question.
56 Cf. B R Y C E, S T U D IE S  IN  H IS T O R Y  A N D  JU R IS P R U D E N C E  415 (1901).
57 “ The borrow ing of money on the sole credit o f the Province.”  C om pare sec. 
91(4).
58 “ The Establishm ent and T enure o f Provincial Offices and the A ppointm ent and 
Paym ent o f Provincial O fficers” . Such officers may have assigned to them  by 
P arliam ent the im plem entation o f federal legislation, see Coughlin  v. Ontario  
H ighw ay Transport Board, [1968] S .C .R . 569, 68 D .L .R . 2d 384; in perform ing 
tha t function, they exercise “ powers as a Federal B oard” , R. v. S m ith , [1972]
S .C .R . 359 a t 366, 367, 23 D .L .R . 2d 222. Om ission o f  express m ention should 
not be construed to invite the wide extension o f federal control approved in Fry v. 
U nited  S ta tes, supra n. 29.
59 "T he M anagem ent and Sale o f the Public Lands Belonging to the Province and 
o f the T im ber and W ood T hereon” .
60 “ T he Establishm ent, M aintenance and M anagem ent o f Public and R eform atory  
Prisons in and for the Province” .
61 “ The E stablishm ent, M aintenance and M anagem ent o f H ospitals, Asylums, 
C harities and E leem osynary Institutions in and for the Province, o ther than 
M arineH osp ita ls” . C om parab le  private institutions would be covered by the 
residuary clause.
62 It has been prem ised ra ther than  system atically dem onstrated  tha t the appointing 
power consequentially conditions the assignm ent of decisional responsibilities. In
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provincial initiatives in moulding the processes of dispute set­
tlement.63 No province is free to adopt, for example, an analogue to 
the Conseil d ’Etat. Why bind them to an inherited pattern of ad­
judication not always well adapted to the positive programmes of 
contemporary government? With general control o f  their own con­
stitutions, including courts and tribunals, they could flexibly adapt to 
felt needs. As a bonus, the phasing out of federal involvement with 
these provincial offices would, like the lieutenant governor change, 
remove a stigma of inferior status.
A more fundamental change which I should myself prefer would 
confide the responsibility for their constitutions to the provinces in­
deed, but not to the provincial legislatures. Instead each province 
would by appropriate special action64 endow itself with an instrument 
of government within which ordinary legislation must be channeled, 
like the constitutions of the American states.65 Really despite the
R e  C oun ty  Courts o f  British C olum bia , 21 S .C .R . 446 (1892), S trong. J., writing 
for the C ourt, said at p. 454, “ . . . the whole power o f legislating as regards the 
jurisd iction  o f provincial courts is en trusted  to the provincial legislature". The 
case arose however in connection with territo rial as contrasted  with subject m at­
ter jurisd iction  and had no effect when cited in argum ent to the Privy Council in 
A .G . O ntario  v. A .G . C anada , [1925] A .C. 750, which without e laboration held 
invalid a provincial sta tu te  bearing on the nature o f judges’ duties. In Reference  
re the A dop tion  A c t , [4938] S .C .R . 398, [1938] 3 D .L .R . 497, the principle was 
taken as settled and that and subsequent cases have dealt only with its applica­
tion.
63 See, for a thorough and thoughtful exam ination o f the m atter, P E P IN , LES 
T R IB U N A U X  A D M IN IS T R A T E S  ET LA C O N S T IT U T IO N , prem ier par- 
tie (1969).
64 So long as the lieutenant governor lim itation with its exclusion of plebiscitary ac­
tion, see supra n.54, rem ains in force, it is hard to  see how the provinces could go 
further than the form ula o f relative im m utability  em ployed in the C anadian Bill 
o f R ights, 8-9 Eliz. II, c.44, s.2 (“ unless it is expressly declared by an A c t . . .  that 
it shall operate notw ithstanding . . . ” ), with w hatever m oral and political restraint 
that m ay im pose. Freed o f that lim itation , it would seem open to  their 
legislatures to organize or recognize conventions to prepare d rafts which after ap­
proval by referendum  or after election o f a new House, could be adopted, with 
any changes thought appropriate , as the constitu tion  of the province by an Act in­
cluding a provision requiring that any am endm ent o f its term s would need prior 
approval by a referendum . Such a provision as a “ m anner and form ” clause 
binding on future legislatures, A .G . fo r  N ew  S o u th  Wales v. Trethgow an , 44 
C .L  R. 394 (1931), a f f d  [1932] A .C. 526, 47 C .L .R  97; accord, C layton  v. Hef- 
f r o n . 105 C .L .R . 214 (1960); W Y N E S, L E G IS L A T IV E , E X E C U T IV E  A N D  
JU D IC IA L  P O W E R S  IN A U S T R A L IA , c .X Il (1970), would without dis­
carding the concept o f parliam entary  suprem acy, in practice give the province the 
substance o f a constitution.
65 See, on the sta tus o f A m erican sta te  constitu tions, Ellingham  v. D ye, 178 Ind. 
336, 99 N .E .I1  (1912); I B R Y C E, T H E  A M E R IC A N  C O M M O N W E A L T H  
420 (1888). Cf. as to  A ustralian sta te  constitu tions, M cC auley  v. The King, 
[1920] A .C. 691; A G. fo r  N  S  W. v. Trethgowan, 44 C .L .R . 394 (1931).
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language of 92(1)66 and the style of some provincial legislation,67 no 
province now has anything that can properly be called a constitution. 
Such, if adopted, could and, in my view, ought to entrench civil liber­
ties and might well contain special provisions about the role of 
municipalities. Those matters are important enough to warrant con­
stitutional attention.6“ Regard for varying local sentiments and local 
situations suggests that a central authority not presume to impose 
Procrustean standards. Both this item and the following one, 
“ municipal and local authorities” would have to be reworded in the 
proposed draft were this better arrangement to be accepted.
The obvious argument against it is its impingement on the con­
cept of parliamentary supremacy.69 It does clearly impinge. Yet we 
have not had unalloyed Parliamentary supremacy since 1867. The 
courts check legislation from each level for constitutionality.70 The 
pure form having already been abandoned, the degree of impurity 
would seem to raise only a question of policy.
66 Subdivision V, being sections 58 to 90 inclusive o f the British N orth  A m erica Act 
1867 is cap tioned “ Provincial C onstitu tions” . Sections 58 to 67 inclusive deal 
with the office o f lieutenant governor, section 68 nam es a city in each o f the four 
original confederating  provinces as "S ea t o f G overnm ent” and the o thers were 
alm ost exclusively preoccupied with the com position and procedures o f the 
Legislature. It is a perm issable although not a necessary inference that the ex­
pression in section 92(1) was understood in the sam e limited sense.
67 See R .S .B .C . 1960, c .7 l.
68 Both the V ictoria C harter, A rts. 1 and 2, and the Report o f the Special Joint 
C om m ittee on the C onstitution o f C anada, c.9, contem plated inclusion of provi­
sions on fundam ental rights in a new federal constitution; and the la tter, c.22, ac­
cepted the claim s o f m unicipalities for a clearer definition and assurance o f their 
governm ental role while feeling it a m atter inappropriate  for a federal constitu­
tion , to be left instead to the provinces. Bills o f Rights and local governm ent 
provisions regularly  appear in sta te  constitu tions in the U nited S tates, see 3 
R E P ’T S O F  N Y. STA T E  C O N S T IT U T IO N A L  C O N V E N T IO N  C O M M IT ­
TE E , C O N S T IT U T IO N S  O F  T H E  S T A T E S  A N D  T H E  U N IT E D  STA T E S
(1938); cf. N A T IO N A L  M U N IC IP A L  L E A G U E . M O D EL S T A T E  C O N ­
S T IT U T IO N  (6th ed. rev.) A rts. I, V III (1968).
69 See C H E F F IN S  & T U C K E R , T H E  C O N S T IT U T IO N A L  P R O C E S S  IN 
C A N A D A  (2d ed. 1976). Kennedy, The Judicia l Process and Canadian 
Legislative Powers, 25 W A SH . U N IV . L.Q . 215 (1940); cf. Kerwin, C on­
stitu tiona lism  in Canada  in S U T H E R L A N D  (ed.) G O V E R N M E N T  U N D E R  
LAW  453 a t 466 (1956). A ustralia, while in general following the Am erican 
model in d rafting  her C onstitu tion  rejected the inclusion o f a Bill o f Rights on 
that very ground, see Dixon, Two C onstitutions C om pared, 28 A .B .A .J. 734 
(1942).
70 The proposition  tha t in C anada courts are concerned not with constitutionality  
but with “vires”, see R ID D E L L . T H E  C A N A D IA N  C O N S T IT U T IO N  7, n.2, 
(1923) leaves untouched the substance o f the m atter, nam ely, that they do in fact 
m onitor s ta tu to ry  validity, and thus seems only a verbal quibble.
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Existence is a prerequisite to action. No living organism can ex­
ist without some composition of its parts nor continue to exist 
without sustenance. Hence taxes and internal structure are needs 
common to the Dominion and the provinces and like powers to make 
provision for them in order. The functions of the two are where they 
differ. To enable their due performance, the grants o f  power as to 
them must correspondingly differ.
Sections 91 and 92 of the 1867 Act and the successor provisions 
of the present proposal both are so framed. The latter are in large 
measure a more compact restatement of the older formulas. Yet they 
do involve important shifts. These are in both directions so that it 
would be inaccurate to see them as aggrandizements of either level at 
the expense of the other. The notion is to give each level the strength 
to cope with the conditioning elements of the Canadian situation as 
to which it wMl be most effectual. The examination that follows seeks 
to indicate the consistency of both the restatements and the shifts 
with that objective.
The “ peace, order and good government” clause, so loosely 
read sometimes as to make nearly everything federal,71 was converse­
ly at one time shrunk in application into virtual insignificance.72 Its 
shimmering imprecision as a text is to be removed. Where recourse 
to it has been useful, precise authority is given — “defence against 
war or insurrection” ,71 the government of the National Capital Ter­
ritory74 and other areas outside provincial boundaries7', as much of
71 In Russell v. The Q ueen, 7 App. C as. 829 (1882) the court reasoned tha t, because 
P arliam ent deem ed uniform legislation th roughout the Dom inion desirable and 
because no province, for want o f power to  legislate ex tra territo ria lly , could bring 
uniform ity about, Parliam entary  power existed. This line o f reasoning, which 
would have opened up to federal contro l everything Parliam ent thought im por­
tant enough to m erit its provision o f a uniform  rule, was later explicitly 
repudiated, see, e.g. In re the Board o f  C om m erce A c t , 60 S .C .R . 456, 54 D .L .R . 
354 (1920).
72 Thus it was taken  to be dependent on the existence of an "em ergency” , see Fort 
Frances Pulp & Power Co. L td. v. M anitoba Free Preys Co. Ltd. [1923] A.C. 
695, [1923] 3 D .L .R . 629 accord, Toronto  Electric C om m 'rs  v. Snider, [1925] 
A .C . 396, [1925] 2 D .L .R . 5.
73 Fort Frances Pulp <£ Power Co. L td. v. M anitoba Free Press L td ., supra Co­
operative C om m ittee  on Japanese Canadians v. A .G . Can., [1947] A .C . 87, 
[1947] I D .L .R . 577; R eference re Validity o f  W artim e Leasehold Regulations, 
[19501 S .C .R . 124, [1950] 2 D .L .R . 1.
74 See, M unro  v. N ational Capital C om m ission , [1966] S .C .R . 663, 57 D .L .R . 2d 
753. N ote tha t the provision in speaking o f the areas “ outside . . . any province 
and  . . .  the N ational C apital T e rrito ry ” m akes a distinction which recognizes 
that the la tte r continues to be a part o f the Provinces in which it is erected, thus 
respecting Q uebec’s repugnance to  any dim inution of her territory .
75 Cf. Reference re O ffshore M ineral R igh ts o f  British C olum bia , [1967] S .C .R . 
792, 65 D .L .R . 2d 353; see Poole, The Boundaries o f  Canada, 42 C A N . BAR 
REV. 100 (1964).
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treaty enforcement as is of truly international concern,76 federal 
government operations which had to rely on it for want of any other 
basis.77 Federal companies legislation78 must indeed find other sup­
port; this virtually reverses the present situation so that the presence 
of “ federal” rather than of “ provincial” objects would be crucial, but 
why other companies should receive federal charters is a mystery.71' 
For the still unexplored field of environmental protection80 where it 
might prove useful, there is express recognition of federal com­
petence.
Had the true purpose of inserting the clause, namely, to serve as 
a counterpoise to section 92(16), been realized, one would be reluc­
tant to drop it. The breakdown in practice of the divided residuary 
power has so irretrievably distorted the precedents that it seems ad­
visable not to leave it cluttering up the text.
Rather than its empty promise, Parliament would get all authority 
requisite for management of the economy. The first numbered sub­
division of new section 91 gives it and a bit more.
76 Cf. Laskin, S o m e  International Legal A spects o f  Federalism: The Experience o f  
Canada  in C U R R IE  (ed). F E D E R A L IS M  A N D  T H E  N EW  N A T IO N S  O F 
A F R IC A  389 (1964).
77 Supra , n. 48.
78 John Deere Plow Co. v. W harton , [1915] A .C. 330, 18 D .L .R . 353 found federal 
authority  for the general incorporation o f com panies in the “ peace, order and 
good governm ent” clause with a helping hand from  the “ trade and com m erce” 
clause.
79 The relevance of the clause was predicated in John Deere Plow Co. v. W harton, 
supra, on the proposition tha t the lim itation o f  the provincial power to “ the Incor­
poration of C om panies with Provincial O bjects", B .N .A ., sec. 92(11) prevented 
the provinces from  erecting com panies with the capacity for Dom inion-w ide ac­
tivity, thus leaving a gap in power unless the Dominion could act; but Bonanza  
Creek G old M ining Co. v. The King, [1916] I A .C. 566, 26 D .L .R  273 alm ost im ­
m ediately repudiated that proposition in recognizing that the lim itation on 
capacity  was not a territo rial one, thus undercutting the reasoning o f John Deere. 
G ranted  that a functional lim itation o f provincial power may result from the 
language of 92(11), cf. K ootenay  <$ Elk R y  Co. v. C .P .R .. 28 D .L .R . 3d 385 
(S .C .C .), that would m ean simpiy that where the objects were federal, charters 
could be g ranted  by the Dom inion as a way of achieving its granted powers.
80 The relevance o f the “ fisheries” clause o f sec. 91 for w ater pollution legislation is 
canvassed by the Suprem e C ourt o f C anada in Interprovincial Co-operatives Ltd. 
v. The Q ueen , 53 D .L .R . 3d 321 (1975); the judgm ent apparently  finds some 
m easure o f federal com petence in the area but its extent and particularly  its con­
sequences for provincial legislation uncom plicated by a basis for application o f 
param ountcy  is left uncertain because o f the different analyses in the opinions of 
Laskin, C .J . and of R itchie and Pigeon. J .J . O n air pollution, see Alhéritiéne, Les 
Problèm es Constitutionelles de la L u tte  contre La Pollution de / ’Espace A t ­
m osphérique au C anada , 50 C A N . BAR REV. 560 (1972).
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Section 91(2) of the 1867 Act could have." The more weakly 
worded commerce clause in the United States Constitution82 has suf­
ficed for that, has indeed been extravagantly extended.*3 “ Trade and 
commerce” could cover it all. Its use is discontinued only to avoid 
recourse to its unhappy past.84 The nadir was ignominious relegation
81 “ Econom ic p lanning" and "contro lled  econom y” are 20th century locutions. So 
far as I can ascertain , neither M arx, Mill nor M arshall (to  nam e m ajor 19th cen­
tury figures) ever spoke in those term s. T he concepts them selves were o f course 
older both as theories and as practices. M ore notably developed under the in­
fluence o f C olbert and longer m aintained in France than  in Britain, as “ m ercan­
tilism ", see I H E C K S C H E R , M E R C A N T IL IS M , chapters V, VI (trans. 
S hapiro) (1934), it was in the 19th century still vigorous on the continent, es­
pecially in G erm any through L ist's advocacy, see G ID E  Sl R IS T , H IS T O R Y  
O F E C O N O M IC  D O C T R IN E S  264 (trans. R ichards, 2d ed. rev.), “ M ercan­
tilism ", the label a ttached to  the C olbertian  system of active sta te  direction of 
econom ic affairs, has a clear verbal affinity with “ com m erce", a kinship con­
firmed by such evidences as that C olbert's  body of regulations for the econom ic 
sphere was styled O rdonnance de C om m erce and that A dam  Sm ith, addressing 
him self (adversely) in T H E  W E A LT H  O F  N A T IO N S  a century later to the 
tenets o f the program m e, w rote “ O f the Principles o f  the C om m ercial or M er­
cantile System ” (Book IV, c .l) , using the term s in apposition. In 19th century 
C anada, as in Britain, while there were m ore “ governm ental in terventions", to 
use M ill’s expression, than we are accustom ed to associate with what we simplify 
as a laissez-faire econom y, they were particularistic and haphazard . For dom estic 
enterprise, they were disfavoured in principle though present in practice. For 
foreign transactions, the situation  was different. A large corpus o f sta te controls 
persisted and was accepted generally by politicians as appropriate , less generally 
by w riters about political econom y. T hat, being the focal point o f disputed policy, 
was the context in which the expressions “ com m ercial" and “ com m erce” are 
com m only found in Contem porary discussions, including those about the 
proposals for confederation. The circum stances o f the tim es thus led to their ap­
pearance largely in a special setting and gave little occasion for applying them  to  
dom estic policies. A survey o f what was said and w ritten supports the view, 
however, that “ com m erce” was used as a generic description of m easures relating 
to econom ic activity in, it is true, a special application but without indicating an 
intention of lim itation to it. W hile, as seem s likely, the Fathers of C onfederation 
did not envisage much use o f econom ic regulation, what use there m ight be had to 
be accom m odated  within the constitu tional fram ew ork and “ com m erce” was the 
current term  for subsum ing it.
82 T hat clause, U .S . C O N ST . A R T . 1, s.8, c l.3 does not m ention “ trad e"  and 
delineates “ com m erce" lim itatively as that “ with foreign N ations, and am ong 
the several S tates, and with the Indian T ribes” . For what was envisaged by the 
gran t, see Abel, The C om m erce Clause in the C onstitu tional Convention and in 
C ontem porary C o m m en t, 25 M IN N . L. REV. 432 (1941).
83 The C om m erce C lause has been used to support federal control over e.g., the 
am ount o f grain the owner o f a family farm  can raise prim arily  for feed for his 
own livestock, W ickard  v. Filburn, 317 U .S . I l l ,  63 S. C t. 82, 87 L.ed. 122 
(1942), con tract window washing on prem ises o f industrial and com m ercial 
enterprises, M artino  v. M ichigan W indow Cleaning Co.. 327 U .S. 173, 90 L.ed. 
603 (1946); and m inim um  fee schedules for residential title searches, G oldfarb  v. 
Virginia S ta te  Bar, 44 L.ed. 2d 572, 95 S .C t. (1975).
84 An excellent survey o f its m isadventures is S M IT H , T H E  C O M M E R C E  
P O W E R  IN C A N A D A  A N D  T H E  U N IT E D  S T A T E S, chapters 1-4 (1963).
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to  the sta tus o f  a mere helper clause .85 While the  old wisdom of the 
Parsons case86 is apparen tly  being resurrected ,87 the courts  should 
not be subjected to the chancy choice o f  following or  distinguishing 
the intervening decisions. “ S truc tu re  and functioning o f  the 
econom y” is subm itted  as a m ore  roundabou t but,  one hopes, more 
shr inkproof  paraphrase.
The specifications under it em phasize the am plitude o f  the 
grant.  They em brace in abbreviated  version the majority  o f  the clas­
ses o f  subjects in present section 91, as I shall show. Their  being set 
out as non-exclusive illustrations confirms and emphasizes the 
bread th  o f  the main head ra the r  than inviting t rea tm en t as restric­
tions on it the way the collocation argum ent m ade  parallel listing cut 
down “ trade and com m erce” .
Besides 91(2) itself, all o f  the classes o f  subjects in 91(9) to 
91(23) inclusive plus the referentially incorporated  provisions of  
92(10) (a) and (b) and the federally significant portion of  section 95 
are carried over as federal but not all the constructional twists they 
have suffered. Econom ic context and pluri-provincial im pact are the 
param ete rs  for what is created, transferred  or withheld as the case 
may be.
“ Industrial and intellectual p roper ty” widens 91(22) and (23) to 
include things like trade  m arks,  trade  names, trade  secrets and com ­
mon law literary proper ty .88
“ M oney” epitomizes the conten ts  o f  91(14),89 91 (20),**° and “ the 
issue o f  paper m oney” part o f  91(14).91 “ Credit  institutions”
85 See LASK IN’S CANADIAN CO N STITU TIO N A L LAW 243 (4th ed. rev. 
Abel) (1975).
86 Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons, 7 App. Cas. 96 (1881).
87 See MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd., (Can. unrep. Jan. 30, 1976).
88 A Dominion competence to regulate trade marks has been indicated, based 
however not on 91(22) and 91(23) dealing respectively with “ Patents of Invention 
and Discovery” and Tradem arks” but on “ trade and commerce” , see A.G. On­
tario v. A.G. Canada, {1937] A.C. 405, [1937] I D.L.R. 702; but trade secret 
protection is not a legitimate Parliamentary concern, see MacDonald v. Vapor 
Canada Ltd.. supra. Such things as local delivery routes would not satisfy the 
primary quality of affecting ” the structure and functioning of the economy” ; but 
the more egregious appropriations of intellectual and industrial property 
characteristically involve firms or products or both whose markets is of national 
dimensions or at least hoped to be.
89 “Currency and Coinage” .
90 “ Legal tender".
91 Coupling "the Issue of Paper Money” with "Banking (and) the Incorporation of 
Banks” , however odd it now appears, reflects the situation obtaining at 
Confederation and stubbornly maintained for many decades, under which the 
note issue of banks constituted a large part of the circulating medium of the
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em braces the rest o f  91(14), all o f  91(16) and 91(21). Also together 
they cover 91(18) and very nearly all o f  91(19). “ Institu t ions” is used 
not as meaning “ financial es tab lishm ents”  but the financial es­
tab lishm ent,92 tha t  is to say, the whole body o f  m echanism s whose 
function is the  supply o f  and dealings in credit. C red it  as a co m ­
modity for inventory or sale so approxim ates  “ private m oney” that 
its control is essential to effective m onetary  m anagem en t .95 And 
most m odern  thought sees m onetary  m anagem ent like fiscal 
m anagem ent as a prime instrum ent in economic regulation, however 
much estim ates of  their relative im portance differ.94 The  credit a r ­
rangem ents of  the provinces themselves and o f  their m unicipalities95 
com e m ore  properly within the first two num bered  clauses of  new 
section 92 than here but could be expressly exempted if thought 
desirable.
T he  subjects discussed in the two preceding paragraphs  must 
have a com m on value th roughou t C a n ad a  in order  to be w orth  much 
anywhere. U n iform ity  is intrinsically im portan t .  Thus  they are 
stated w ithout qualification.
T h a t  is not so of  their com panions lettered (c) and (d) (nor of 
the environm enta l m atte rs  dealt with in new 91 (2 )) .  To  bring them 
into play, the things regulated must have a substantial ex traprovin­
cial dimension. T o  adopt the language of  Justice Pigeon in the Caloil 
Case, anything which “ is an integral par t  o f  . , . contro l . . .  in the
country, see Shortt, The Banking System o f Canada in 10 SH ORTT & 
DOUGHTY (eds.) CANADA AND ITS PROVINCES 627 (1913). It was not 
until 1944 that this practice was terminated. See generally JA M IESO N , 
C H A R TER ED  BANKING IN CANADA (1953).
92 The Oxford English Dictionary gives, as the sixth definition “ An established law, 
custom, usage, practice, organization or other element in the political or social 
life of a people; . . It is in this sense, rather than that of the seventh definition, 
“ An establishment, organization or association instituted for the promotion of 
some object” that the expression has been chosen, a choice supported by the cir­
cumstance that it seems conformable also to the relative employment in the 
French language. Of course, if the term is thought to be ambiguous and a better 
one can be substituted, it should, for it is not suggested that the power be confined 
to the specification of formal structures.
93 The Report o f  The Royal Commission on Banking and Finance ( Porter Commis­
sion) 1964, c.18, discusses the independence and need for comprehensive regula­
tion of credit institutions.
94 See, e.g., HA RROD, ECONOM IC DYNAM ICS, c.10 (1973); MEADE, THE 
CO N TRO LLED  ECONOM Y, cc. XXII, XXIII (1971); ROSTOW, PLA N N ­
ING FOR FREEDOM , c.9 (1959).
95 See Ladore v. Bennett, [1939] A.C. 468, [1939] 3 D.L.R. 1 (. . . legislation, if 
directed bona fide to the effective creation and control of municipal institutions, 
is in no way an encroachment upon the general exclusive power of the Dominion 
Legislature over interest; nor, the case held, over “ bankruptcy and insolvency” ).
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furtherance of  an extra-provincial.. .policy” 96 would be for Parl ia­
m ent. It would, however, be confined, to adap t C h ief  Justice 
Lask in ’s expression in the Vapor Canada Case to  “ general 
regulatory  scheme(s) to govern ...re lat ions going beyond merely local 
concern” .97 Both observations were m ade  in cases dealing with 
“ trade  and com m erce” but the...line o f  division they announce traces 
a principle appropria te  for application beyond the context of  trading 
transactions in which they were uttered. T ha t  b roader  application is 
m ade while incorporating  the general principle.
Relations may “ go beyond merely local concern” , may have 
“ substan tia l” significance, effects, or consequences, outside the 
province where the ta rge t segm ent of  activity takes place.98 Failure to 
apprecia te  tha t  was the vice o f  the Eastern Terminal Elevator Case99 
and arguably o f  the Board o f  Commerce Case.'00 Conversely, to 
federalize activity o f  m arginal extraprovincial im pact because it 
steps over a provincial l ine101 serves no real purpose. Consequences 
not ca r tography  should be controlling.
New 91(1 )(c) patently  deals with the interprovincial works and 
undertak ings now falling under 92(10)(a), the o thers and the 
S team ships o f  92(10)(b)102 also rem aining federal but by virtue of
96 Cat oil Inc. v. A.G. Canada, [1971] S.C.R. 543 at 551. 20 D.L.R. 3d 472 at
97 MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd. (unrep. dated 30 Jan. 1976).
98 The substantiality will necessarily be relative. A comparison of consequences 
within the province with those beyond the province would be involved. Failure to 
make such an analysis is a legitimate ground of reproach to the judgment of the 
Privy Council. (1954] A.C. 541, [1954] 4 D.L.R. 657. 13 W .W .R.N.S. 657 in­
sofar as it reversed that of the Suprem eCourt of Canada [1951] S.C.R. 887, 
[1951] 4 D.L.R. 529, in A.G. Ont. v. Winner. Failure to provide materials as a 
basis of such analysis occasioned Laskin, J .’s reluctance to respond in A.G. 
Manitoba v. Manitoba Egg <$ Poultry Ass'n , [1971] S.C.R. 689, 19 D.L.R. 3d 
169, [1971] 4 W.W.R. [1971] 4 W .W .R. 705. This relation is in fact taken into 
consideration under the bland and familiar concept of “ incidental’* or “conse­
quential” effects, see Reference re Farm Products Marketing Act. [1957] S.C.R. 
198, 7 D.L.R. 2d 257, 319 (per Abbott, J.); Carnation Co. Ltd. v. Quebec 
Agricultural Marketing Board. [1968] S.C.R. 238, 67 D.L.R. 2d I . It is not sug­
gested that the weight assigned the two components be other than that which they 
seem to have received in the last two cases cited nor that the inquiry simply be 
into which predominates, only that the grounds on which assessment is made be 
more adequately revealed to and by the courts.
99 [1925] S.C.R. 434, [1925] 3 D.L.R. I.
100 60 S.C.R. 456, 54 D.L.R. 354, [1920] 3 W .W .R. 658 (3-3 decision) (per Duff, J.), 
[1922] I A.C. 191, 60 D.L.R. 513 [1922] I W .W .R. 20.
101 Cf. R v. Cooksville Magistrates Court; Ex p Liquid Cargo Lines Ltd., [1965] I
O R. 84, 46 D.L.R. 2d 700. A fortiori, activities which have no extraprovincial 
potential seem best left to the provinces; contra R v. Canada Steamship Lines 
Ltd., [I960] O.W .N. 277; R v. Rice, [1963] I C.C.C. 108.
102 The clause applies only to “ Lines . . . between the Province and any British or 
Foreign Country” .
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P ar l ia m en t’s control over external affairs. 92(10)(c), the power to 
declare works for the general advantage o f  C a nada ,  would be d ro p ­
ped. It already has fallen into virtual desuetude. Any “ w orks”  — 
and this would include undertak ings  — “ wholly s ituate within the 
Province” which figure in “ the s tructure  and functioning o f  the 
econom y” would as such be open to federal regulation without the 
formality  o f  a dec la ra tion .103 W hy should others be?
New 91(1 )(c) also sweeps up a num ber  o f  present 91’s classes o f  
subjects — clauses 9 ,104 11105 and 13.106 Except for a completely d is­
sociated bit of  intraprovincial navigation and shipping, if such there 
be ,107 91(10) would also fall within it. “ A eronau t ics” , ra the r  curious­
ly erected as a constructive “ class o f  subject”  through the side door
103 Thus, except for the straitened construction of "trade and commerce" in The 
King v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.R. 434, [1925] 3 D.L.R. 1, it 
should have been possible for Parliament to regulate the trade in grain, at the 
time Canada's staple and still a major component in the economy, without the 
need to resort to declaring all elevators in the country “ works for the general ad­
vantage of C anada” , see Canada Grain Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.G-16, s .174; cf. 
Jorgenson v. A.G. Canada, [1971] S.C.R. 725, 18 D.L.R. 3d 297.
104 Conceivably some “ beacons" and “ buoys” might be in bodies of water having lit­
tle extraprovincial traffic but hardly any "lighthouses” would be. Sable Island 
could well be allowed to return to Nova Scotia; with the invention of radar, 
whatever basis may have once existed for assigning it to federal control has disap­
peared.
105 Although today "quarantine” brings to mind ideas of internal health measures 
(insofar as replacement of home by hospital medical care, has not rendered it an 
antiquated and unfamiliar notion), in the mid-nineteenth century the tragedies a t­
tendant on the arrival of Irish immigrants after the potato famine, see Parr, The 
Welcome and the Wake, 66 ONT. HIST. 101 (1974), and for a similar earlier 
crisis, see Bilson, Cholera in Upper Canada 1832, 67 id. 15 (1975), were a recent 
memory, to which quarantine laws, were an appropriate and traditional response, 
cf. Lee, Limitations Imposed by the Federal Constitution on the Right o f the 
States to Enact Quarantine Laws, 2 HARV. L. REV. 267 (1889). Note, the 
author’s statement at p. 278, "Q uarantine laws are, from their very nature, 
regulations of foreign and interstate commerce."
106 Regulation of intraprovincial ferries is within provincial competence, see Owen 
Sound Transportation Co. v. Tackaberry, [1936] 3 D.L.R. 272, [1936] O.W .N. 
323.
107 The reasoning in Agence Maritime Inc. v. Canada Labour Relations Board,
[1969] S.C.R. 851, 12 D.L.R. 3d 722, is confusing. In leaving to provincial con­
trol the labour relations of crews engaged purely in intraprovincial voyages, 
Fauteux, J. read section 92(10) (a), (b) of the B.N.A. Act 1867 as “excluding 
from the competence of Parliament enterprises of water carriage whose opera­
tions are carried out strictly within one province" but qualified it as subject to 
"certain exceptions . . .  for what must be regarded as arising from the aspect 
navigation” .
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o f  “ peace, order  and good governm ent” 108 would be on exactly the 
sam e basis as w ate rborne traffic. Since it is as e lements in the “ struc­
ture and functioning o f  the econom y” tha t  “ t ransporta t ion  and c o m ­
m unication  facilities and services” are reserved for federal control ,  
the p ro g ram m e contents o f  the com m unications m edia can be left to 
the provinces to regula te .109
New section 91 (1) (b) has however the chief par t  in revitalizing 
“ trade  and com m erce” . C o-ord inat ion  o f  labor, com m odities  and 
capital m arke ts  am ongst  the provinces in the way the trea ty  o f  R om e 
co-ordinates  them in Europe, to  the sam e ends o f  avoiding internal 
d iscrim ination  and creating  external s t ren g th ,"0 still as in 1867 re­
quires the action o f  a central authori ty .
Over-specification weakened the force of  the grant.  “ Weights ?nd 
m easures” , section 91 (17), for instance, are elements in co m ­
modities t ranactions for which a com m on s tandard  is highly con ­
108 Johanneson v. West St. Paul, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 609; accord. 
In re Regulation and Control o f  Aeronautics in Canada, [1932] A.C. 54, [1932] 1 
D.L.R. 58, for a discussion see McNairn, Aeronautics and the Constitution, 49 
CAN. BAR REV. 411 (1971).
109 Essentially the respective regulatory spheres of the federal government and the 
provinces would conform to the recommendations in the Report of the Royal 
Commission on Radio Broadcasting (Aird Commission) (1929) which were 
stultified by Re Regulation and Control o f Radio Communication in Canada, 
[1932] A.C. 304, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 81.
110 The Treaty (of Rome) Establishing the European Economic Community an­
nounced the following fundamental Principles: "A rt. 2. The Community shall 
have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively approx­
imating the economic policies of Member States to promote throughout the 
Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and 
balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the stan­
dard of living, and closer relations between he States belonging to it. Art. 3 for 
the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall include, as 
provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therin: (a) the 
elimination as between Member States, of customs duties and of quantitiative 
restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other measures having 
equivalent effect; (b) the establishment of a common customs tariff and of a com­
mon commercial policy towards third countries; (c) the abolition, as between 
Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and 
capital; (d) the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of agriculture; (e) the 
adoption of a common policy in the sphere of transport; (0  the institution of a 
system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted; (g) the 
application of procedures by which the economic policeis of member states can 
be co-ordinated and disequilibria in theier balances of payments remedied; (h) the 
approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the proper 
functioning of the common market; (i) the creation of a European Social Fund in 
order to improve employment opportunities for workers and to contribute to the 
raising of their standard of living; (j) the establishment of a European Investment 
Bank to facilitate the economic expansion of the Community by opening up fresh 
resources . . ."
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venient if not indeed essential.1" Failure to mention them merely 
removes excess verbiage.
The “ agr icu ltu re” and “ fisheries”  classes o f  subjects are 
ano ther  story. In 1867 these were, particularly  in certain provinces, 
the d om inan t  as they continue to be im portan t  branches o f  economic 
activ ity .112 Strengthening  their position was for m any a m ajo r  a t t ra c ­
tion o f  Confederation .  T here  was real concern with agriculture as an 
industry and fisheries as an industry .11’ T he substituted conception of 
them  as activities114 has drained from these g ran ts  their original con­
t e n t . " 5 Trivializing Dominion au thori ty  to the ploughboy behind the 
plough and the spor tsm an  in the t rou t  s tream  has not only degraded 
them ; it has  blinded the courts  to looking at them  as com ponents  of  
t rade  and com m erce.  With no special status, fisheries and 
agriculture would be open to P ar l iam en ta ry  regulation to just  the 
sam e extent as all other gainful pursuits.
111 “ With us in England, the King’s prerogative, so far as it relates to mere domestic 
commerce, will fall principally under the following articles:- . . . Secondly, the 
regulation of weights and measures. These, for the advantage of the public ought 
to be universally the same throughout the Kingdom, being the general criterions 
which reduce all things to the same or an equivalent value” . I BLACKSTONE 
C O M M EN TA R IES *274 (1765). The manifest commercial advantage of co­
ordinating weights and measures has been a main argument for the even more ex­
tensive uniformity represented by the adoption of the metric system, see De 
Simone, Moving to Metric Makes Dollars and Sense, 50 HARV. BUS. REV.
100 (1972). It is noteworthy that land measurements are not included and that 
Quebec’s arpenteurs have always dealt in hectares, not acres.
112 On the fisheries, IN N IS, THE COD FISH ER IES (rev. ed. 1954) is classic. Cf. 
Lawr, The Development o f  Ontario Farming 1870-1914, Patterns o f  Growth and 
Change, 44 ONT. HIST. 239 (1972); Reid, Company Mergers in the Fraser 
River Salmon Canning Industry 1885-1902, 56 CAN. HIST. REV. 282 (1975).
113 IN N IS, supra devotes c.XI to a discussion of the situation in the years leading up 
to Confederation.
114 See Lower Mainland Dairy Sales Adjustment Committee v. Crystal Dairy Ltd., 
[19331 A.C. 168, [1933] I D.L.R. 82 ("the agricultural operations of the 
farm ers” ). The King v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.R. 434, [1925]
3 D.L.R. 1 (contrasting "agriculture” and ” a product of agriculture considered 
as an article of trade” ); accord A.G. Saskatchewan v. A.G. Canada, [1949] A.C. 
110, [1949] 2 D.L.R. 145; A G. Canada v. A.G B C.. [1930] A.C. I l l ,  [1930] I 
D.L.R. 194.
115 Ritchie, C.J. said by way of dictum in The Queen v. Robertson, 6 S.C.R. 52 at
120 (1882), “ legislation in regard to ‘inland and sea fisheries' contemplated by 
the British North America was . . .  in reference . . .  to subjects affecting the 
fisheries generally, tending to their regulation, protection and preservation, m at­
ters of a national and general concern artd important to the public; . . .  in other 
words, all such general laws as endure as well to the benefit of the owners of the 
fisheries as to the public at large who are interested in the fisheries as a source o f  
national or provincial wealth, such as those which the local legislatures were, 
previously to and at the time of confederation in the habit of enacting . . .” 
[emphasis supplied] but Lord Tomlin in A.G. Canada v. A.G. B.C., supra re­
jected the contention that earlier legislation gave any guidance as to the content 
of this class of subjects.
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T o recur briefly to param ountcy ,  an overriding provincial pa ra l­
lelism should rarely affect regulations o f  labour, capita l or c o m ­
m od it ies  m a rk e t in g  re la t ions .  E n v iro n m e n ta l  im p a c t s " 6 and  
transporta t ion -com m unica tions  links117 are often localized even 
though crossing provincial lines. O n the o ther  hand , the m arke t  like 
the law is a seamless web responsive th roughou t to  d is turbances 
anywhere. Their  different natures would therefore expose co m m er­
cial regulations much less than the others to the qualification on 
param ountcy .
M ain ta in ing  a com m on in ternational personality  like creating  a 
com m on m arke t implies centralized authority .
O ne clause, “ Defence against war or insurrec tion” , em braces 
both present 91 (4)118 and fragments o f  “ peace, o rder  and good 
governm ent” . " 9 The provisions for P ar l iam en ta ry  au thori ty  over 
“ external affairs” 120 and tha t  “ the power to m ake  treaties is federal” 
fill yawning gaps in the 1867 Act. The S ta tu te  o f  W estm in is te r  1931 
did to o ,121 not as an am endm ent but as a supplem ent.  C anad ian  
treaties fell outside section 132 o f  the British N o rth  A m erica  Act, 
which speaks only of  Empire treaties. T he  com petence to implement 
the form er is left at la rge .122 The proposal clarifies this. In so doing, it 
restricts the trea ty  power itself to m atte rs  on which P ar l iam en t can 
legislate (including of course anything properly within the dom ain  of  
external affairs) .123 P ar l iam en t’s legislative au thori ty  on a trea ty
116 Cf. The CANADA WATER ACT, R.S.C. Ist supp. c.5, sec. 2(1) (adopting as 
the definition of “ interjurisdictional waters" essentially the formula proposed in 
new 91(2) ).
117 See Irwin, Canadian Transportation Infrastructure, 18 CAN. PUB. ADM. 603 
and figures 3 and 4 (1975).
118 The potential of this clause as a support for federal legislation has been relatively 
neglected, resort being had, in cases where it might have seemed relevant, to the 
general clause instead. LASK IN’S CAN ADIA N CO N STITU TIO N A L LAW 
199 (4th ed. rev. Abel) (1975).
119 Supra n. 73.
120 The expression is adopted from the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 
Act 1900, sec. 51(xxix), discussed in W YNES, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE 
AND JU D ICIA L POW ERS IN AUSTRALIA 281 (4th ed. 1970); Lane, The 
External Affairs Power, 40 AUST. L.J. 257 (1967).
121 22 Geo. V, c.4 (U.K.). The development is discussed in GOTLIEB. C A N A ­
DIAN TREATY MAKING 9 (1929).
122 See A G. Canada v. A.G. Ontario, (1937] A.C. 326, [1927] I D.L.R. 673.
123 The proper scope of the “external affairs” clause in the Australian Constitution, 
supra n. 120, has attracted judicial attention in Airlines o f N.S. W. Pity. Ltd. v. 
New South Wales (No. 2), 113 C.L.R . 54 (1964); The King v. Sharkey, 79
C.L.R. 121 (1949); The King v. Burgess, 55 C.L.R. 608 (1936). In a particularly 
full and illuminating discussion in the last case, Dixon, J. said, at pp. 668-669: “ It 
is not easy to interpret and apply the power to make laws with respect to external
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basis is equated  strictly with the federal trea ty  m aking  power so 
limited, thus avoiding the s ituation o f  the United  S tates  where the 
trea ty  loophole permits com plete  erosion o f  state au th o r i ty .124 H om e 
rule would still prevail in hom e affairs, “ external a ffa irs”  being 
limited to m atte rs  impinging on o ther  nat ions’ concerns. Even so, the 
form ula  integrates items at present scattered  th rough the British 
N orth  A m erica  Act. In ternational transporta t ion ,  com m unication ,  
and com m erce have already been m entioned. “ N atu ra liza tion  and 
Aliens”  and “ Im m ig ra t ion” are  similarly affected, as is o f  course the 
obsolescent section 132. T he  p rim ary  question will be trea ty  validity. 
T hat  hinges on what legislative powers the Dom inion has, treaty or 
no treaty , always reckoning am ong  them  power over anything o f  in­
te rna tional m om ent.  The independent variable is the trea ty  power 
with enforcement a dependent variable.
C lothed with these controls over the economy and in ternational 
relations as well as its own housekeeping, P arliam ent could do the 
jobs  calling for a central authori ty .  Those where diversity is critical 
would be left to the provinces.
Their  position under the pa ram ountcy  clause has been 
developed and need not be repeated. T h a t  is also true generally for 
their altered taxing power and for their  control over their own con­
stitutions. It may, however, deserve mention tha t  the form er dis­
affairs. Although it may enable Parliament to make laws operating outside the 
limits of the Commonwealth, it cannot be supposed that its primary purpose was 
to regulate conduct occurring abroad. Prima facie legislation confers rights and 
imposes duties to be enjoyed and fulfilled within the territory. In the case of such 
powers as that at present under consideration the presumption cannot confine the 
legislation to the Commonwealth in the same way as in the case of other powers. 
But the presumption cannot be reversed so that the power prima facie does not 
affect conduct within the Commonwealth and only that outside. I think it evident 
that its purpose was to authorize the Parliament to make laws governing the con­
duct of Australians in and perhaps out of the Commonwealth in reference to m at­
ters affecting the external relations of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth 
might under this power legislate to ensure that its citizens did nothing inside the 
Commonwealth preparatory to or in aid of some action outside the Com­
monwealth which might be considered a violation of international comity, as, for 
instance, a failure on the part of private persons to behave as subjects of a neutral 
power during a war between foreign countries. If a treaty were made which bound 
the Commonwealth in reference to some m atter indisputably international in 
character, a law might be made to secure observance of its obligations if they 
were of a nature affecting the conduct of Australian citizens. On the other hand, 
it seems an extreme view that merely because the Executive Government under­
takes with some other country that the conduct of persons in Australia shall be 
regulated in a particular way, the legislature thereby obtains a power to enact 
that regulation although it relates to a m atter of internal concern which, apart 
from the obligation undertaken by the Executive, could not be considered a m at­
ter of external affairs” .
124 See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 81 S.Ct. 922, 6 L.ed. 2d 218 (1961) 
(state law on interstate succession to realty supplanted).
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penses with special at tention  to section 92(9) and the la tte r  em braces 
the content not only o f  92(1) and much o f  92(14) but also o f  clauses 3 
to 7 inclusive o f  the present Act.
Som ething m ore should be said abou t what giving them  the 
residuary power does to certain enum era ted  “ classes o f  subjects” . In 
general, m aking  the s tructure  and functioning o f  the econom y, “ ex­
ternal affairs” , Dominion organization  and operations the criteria 
would both expand and con trac t  both federal and provincial co m ­
petence regarding several o f  them. The  two-way shift o f  authority  
over agriculture and fisheries is illustrative. AH o f  im m igration  
would becom e federal; some o f  “ in terest” might become provincial.  
C om pany  incorporation  except for com panies  with federal objects 
would be wholly provincial,  thus enlarging the existing grant.  “ M a r ­
riage and divorce” , not just  “ so lem nization” would too; these in­
t im ate  personal relations, abou t which there is no broad consensus, 
were put in the federal list for very particu lar  and ra the r  odd reasons. 
C a n ad a  has gained nothing but lawsuits from an assignment o f  com ­
petence unique am ong  federal systems. “ E duca tion” would continue 
a m atte r  o f  provincial concern, without the clogs which in practice 
have been little if anything m ore  than  a slap in the face to Quebec. 
Each province would shape its own policies and program m es on old 
age and similar pensions al though funds for them  might be expected 
to become available through the opera tions o f  the proposed C a n a ­
dian Equalization Council. U nem ploym ent insurance would c ta se  to 
be distinguished from other types o f  insurance.1“
125 Through influencing both consumption and the propensity to consume, un­
employment insurance programmes do bear on the general level of economic ac­
tivity; but their "stickiness” tells against their employment as a control. In any 
event, the amendment to the British North America Act, B.N.A. Act 1940, 3-4 
Geo. VI, c.36 (U.K.) was not conceived in that sense but was proposed by the 
Rowell-Sirois Commission on welfare grounds, see REPORT, BOOK II, 
RECOM M EN DATION S 24-25 (1939) and pressed by MacKenzie King in an­
ticipation of the 1940 election as calculated to appeal as a shield against feared 
post war unemployment, see 1 PICK ERSGILL, THE M ACKENZIE KING 
RECORD 60-61 (1960). The choice of priorities among redistributuve including 
social welfare policies would seem one more appropriately left to the provinces 
from the resources provided them; the clumsiness of unemployment insurance as 
an economic control weakens any assignment of it to the Dominion on that basis. 
Like other credit institutions, insurance enterprises would still be subject to con­
trol as to loan and investment policies. An impression arising from slipshod 
language in earlier opinions, cf. A .G. Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers, [1924] A.C. 
328, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 789, altogether outside federal regulation has been put at 
rest, see A. G. Ont. v. Wentworth Ins. Co., [1969] S.C.R. 779, 6 D.L.R. 3d 545.
50 U.N.B.  L A W  J O U R N A L
On crim inal law, C a n ad a  is out o f  step with the w orld .126 The 
A m erican co n t ra s t127 if s tanding alone could be discounted; but 
Austra lia  chose it as a m ode l128 and even Scotland after the Act o f  
Union has m ainta ined its local criminal law .129 The ancestral Quebec 
Act explains the C anad ian  ab e rra t io n .130 A ttitudes tow ard  “ old line 
cr im es” are probably  much the same th roughou t the country. N o te  
tha t  burglaries and rapes are  punishable in all the A ustra lian  and 
A m erican states. But in C a n ad a  there is no “ dom ain  o f  crim inal 
law” .131 Som etim es the quality  o f  the conduct affected, as touching 
on “ public order,  safety and m ora ls” ,132 sometim es the sanction it a t ­
tracts ,  “ prohibit( ion) with penal consequences” 133 is invoked to sup­
port federal control.  These al ternative legitimations have built into
126 This is a slight overstatement since most of the criminal law is left to the central 
government in federal states, e.g. Austria and Switzerland, whose law derives 
from the European continental tradition, a situation consonant with the general 
approach of that system to criminal law, see VON BAR, HISTORY OF C O N ­
TIN EN TA L C R IM IN A L LAW (trans. Bell) passim (1916).
127 "(A)n act committed within a State, whether for a good or a bad purpose, or 
whether with an honest or a criminal intent, cannot be made an offense against 
the United States, unless it has some relation to the exercise of a power of 
Congress, or to some m atter within the jurisdiction of the United States. An act 
not having any such relation is one in respect to which the State can alone 
legislate.” U.S. v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670, 673, 24 L.ed. 538, 540.
128 The King v. Kidman, 20 C.L.R. 425 (1915).
129 SM ITH , BRITISH JUSTICE: THE SCOTTISH C O N TR IB U TIO N , c.3 
(1961); see also Gordon, The Lord Advocate and the Crown Office, c.V, in 
McLARTY (ed.) SOURCE BOOK OF AD M INISTRA TIV E LAW IN 
SCOTLAND (1956).
130 “ And whereas the Certainty and Lenity of the Criminal Law of England and the 
Benefits and Advantages resulting from the Use of it, have been sensibly felt by 
the inhabitants, from an experience of more than Nine Years, during which it has 
been uniformly administered; be it therefore enacted by the Authority aforesaid, 
That the same shall continue to be administered, and shall be observed as Law in 
the Province of Quebec, as well in the Description and Quality of the Offence as 
in the Method of Prosecution and Trial . . . ” 14 Geo. I l l,  c.83. For an account of 
the historical origins, see Sterling, The Criminal Law Power and Confederation,
15 U. of T. FAC. OF LAW REV. 1 (1957).
131 Lord's Day Alliance v. A G B C., (1959] S.C.R 497, 19 D.L.R. 2d 97.
132 See Russell v. The Queen, 7 App. Cas. 829 (1882); Reference re Validity o f  Sec­
tion 5(a) o f the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] S.C.R. 1 [1949] 1 D.L.R. 433 (“ public 
peace, order, security, health, morality” ).
133 Proprietary Articles Trade Ass'n v. A.G. Canada, [1931] A.C. 310, 324, [1931] 2 
D.L.R. I.
“ crim inal law”  a potential for universal c o n t ro l134 like th a t  the 
A m ericans have cram m ed  into their com m erce  clause. W orse still, 
the overblown “ criminal law ” power throttles recognition o f  local 
values.135 However much A lber ta  and N ova  Scotia  differ in the im ­
portance they respectively a t tach  to the a lteration o f  cattle brands 
and the d is turbance o f  lobster pots, it is not theirs to say what shall 
be done, at least if O tta w a  has spoken. S tandards  o f  behavious and 
m ore  cogently of  misbehaviour reflect our  varied history and 
geography. The  b road  reaches of  C a n a d a  fully as much as the n a r ­
row range o f  the Pyrenees witness, perhaps engender different ideas 
o f  right and wrong.
Old habit m akes C anad ians  accept as natural this extraord inary  
assignment of  cr im inal law to federal authority . Therefore  it seems 
advisable not to  leave the change to be deduced from  the gran t  o f  
residuary power but to flag it clearly. Enough would be left with
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134 A.G. B.C. v. Sm ith, [1967] S.C.R. 802, 65 D.L.R. 2d 82 demonstrates how far 
this can go. The Court there sustained the validity of the Juvenile Delinquents 
Act, R.S.C. 1952, c.160 with the consequence of rendering British Columbia 
legislation inoperative. The Juvenile Delinquents Act declaring that a juvenile 
should “be treated, not as a criminal” established “an offence to be known as a 
delinquency” to embrace the violation “ of any Dominion or provincial statute, or 
o f any by-law or ordinance o f any municipality” (italics supplied). The paradox­
ical result was that the enactment — provincial statute or municipal ordinance — 
whose existence was critical for the definition of conduct as anti-social by assign­
ing that character to it withdrew it from provincial concern. The prosecution 
frustrated was in fact for violation of provincial traffic laws. The case is discussed 
in McNairn, Note, 46 CAN. BAR REV. 474 (1968).
135 The Special Joint Committee on the Constitution of Canada felt the force of this 
consideration but could not bring itself to shift the power, suggesting instead the 
expedient of specific delegations. It said, “ We believe that there is an even better 
reason for a Provincial role in the criminal law area than the clarification of con­
cepts and the improved resolution of conflicts. The criminal law is, after all, an 
expression of the moral views and the mores of a people, and it is obvious that the 
views of Canadians in matters of behaviour differ considerably across the 
country, and often markedly from Province to Province. In the United States this 
is recognized by locating the criminal law power principally in the state govern­
ments with a mere supplementary power in the federal government. We see no 
need for so radical a change in Canadian federalism, but we can also see no 
reason why each province should not be able to regulate the conduct of its own 
people in m atters such as the laws relating to the operation of motor vehicles, lot­
teries, betting, and Sunday observance . . . We favour greater freedom for the 
Provinces to control the behaviour of their people, and to experiment on a 
Province-wide scale . . . We have therefore decided to recommend, in this one 
area, a power of delegation from the Federal to the Provincial Legislatures. We 
believe it should be exercisable at the option of a single Province, subject to the 
concurrence of Parliament . . . (W) believe that the delegation of many subjects 
within the criminal law power to the Provinces would be beneficial in allowing 
people to have criminal legislation which more closely reflected the consensus in 
their part of the country as to socially tolerable behaviour. We see this as a gain } 
for democracy, and in line with our other recommendations for fuller JJsawirtial 
control over the quality and style of life.” REPORT, c.2] (L972).‘
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Parliam en t to let it a t tach  penal sanctions to  violation o f  the laws it 
is com peten t to m ake. 92(15) now does as m uch for the provinces156 
and, while tha t  section is itself to be swallowed up by the new provi­
sion, it serves as a model. C ut loose from any “ settled d o m a in ” , 
cr im inal law loses all substantive content to becom e a description 
only o f  an enforcem ent technique. So considered, it is a corollary  o f  
and co-extensive with the right to enact the measures being enforced.
Though section 91(27) could d isappear there could by virtue o f  
clause 5 in successor section 92 still be federal penitentiaries. The 
restricted range o f  federal crimes probably would mean in practice a 
smaller federal penitentiary service.
Clause 4 o f  new 92 applies equally to non-criminal m atte rs .  For 
them, however, it is in line with w hat we now have. The “ adm in is t ra ­
tion of  jus t ice” of  92(14) keeps its place but with the regulation o f  
procedure enlarged to encom pass all, and not just civil procedure . 
Rephrasing will, it is hoped, restore to “ property  and civil r ights” its 
essential nature. A heritage, like criminal law, from the Quebec 
A c t ,137 the historic content of  the expression was the corpus of  
private law governing the reciprocal relations o f  persons13* as dis­
tinguished from public law defining their relations with the state, 
conspicuously instanced by the criminal law. A telescoping of  
“ property  and civil rights” and “ local and p rivate” , induced by the 
am plitude of  each as m ere verbal expressions, resulted for many 
years in neither having any clear meaning. A tendency has been 
emerging to recognize the distinction and to ascribe to “ property  and 
civil rights” the meaning above noted. The mention together  o f  civil 
and criminal is intended to bring tha t  meaning into stronger relief.
Endowed with the above powers, the provinces should be able to
136 Canadian Pacific Wine Co v. Tuley, [1921] 2 A.C. 417.
137 14 Geo. I ll, c.63 (“ And be it further enacted . . .  That all His Majesty’s Canadian 
Subjects, within the Province of Quebec . . . may . . . hold and enjoy their 
property and possessions, together with all Customs and Usages relative thereto, 
and all other of their Civil Rights, in as large, ample, and beneficial Manner, as if 
. . .  [the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763 and orders under it] had not been 
made . . . and that in all M atters of Controversy, relative to Property and Civil 
Rights, Resort shall be had to the laws of Canada, as the rule for the decision of 
the Same” ), cf. Stats. Upper Canada 1792, c.l; see Citizens Insurance Co. v. 
Parsons, 7 App. Cas. 96 (1881), Saumur v. Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, [1953] 4 
D.L.R. 641.
138 “ What the language is directed to are laws relating to civil status and capacity, 
contracts, torts and real and personal property in the common law Provinces, 
jural constructs springing from the same roots . . . ” Reference re Farm Products 
Marketing A ct, [1957] S.C.R. 198, 7 D.L.R. 2d 257, 271 (per Rand, J.); accord, 
A.G. Ont. v. Barfried Enterprises Ltd., [1963] S.C.R. 570,42 D.L.R. 2d 137. See 
TREM BLAY, LES COM PETENCES LEGISLATIVES AU CANADA ET 
LES POUVOIRS PROVINCIA UX EN M A TIERE DE PR O PR IETE ET DE 
DROITS CIVILS (1967) for a very full and thoughtful discussion of the subject.
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provide the fram ew ork  of  varied regulation reflecting the variety of  
local values and views which must be respected if we are to continue 
to  live together.
Correcting  the resource im balance am ong  regions, the third 
conditioning c ircum stance o f  national life, is only tangentially  af­
fected by the provisions 1 have discussed. The most relevant is the 
limitation on Parl iam en ta ry  control over federal property. C learly  a 
surplus available for distribution  to  the less wealthy provinces has to 
be accum ulated  and by federal action. The federal taxing power 
would be broad as great as ever, so accum ulation  would be as possi­
ble as ever. Tax proceeds would be useable only for properly federal 
p rogram m es, however. In the post-war years, revenues have always 
far exceeded their cost and have been used for transfer  payments. 
Em ploym ent o f  fiscal m easures as a tool o f  economic control may be 
expected to continue to generate  surpluses. D istribution is the 
problem . The  provinces should not have to keep selling their 
birthrights for a mess of  federal pottage. The C anad ian  Equalization 
Council would, I believe, solve this problem.
A description of  it is one of  m any things which fall outside the 
subject and space limits of  this discussion. O thers  to which I have 
given thought include the federal judicial establishm ent and the inter 
se relations o f  the provinces. O thers  still, on which I have not as yet 
any clear views, include the am ending process, the fact and form o f  a 
Bill o f  Rights, and the British connection. The dem arca tion  of  
federal and provincial com petence which has been explored is only a 
fragm ent o f  a to ta l constitution. But it is a very im portan t fragment.
There is no near prospect of  anything like the above being ac­
cepted. T here  is an absolute certain ty  tha t  something along these 
general lines will ultimately com e to pass or C a n a d a  will dissolve. 
Self-preservation being as strong an instinct with politicians as with 
the rest o f  us, they will stagger along bantering patchw ork  solutions 
at each other. Even if  agreem ent on tha t  basis can be reached, 
anything short o f  a fundam ental remodelling taking account o f  the 
needs and conditions of  national life will not suffice.IW Those in 
authori ty  will not d iscard familiar patterns  until the very eve o f  a 
breakup. It m ay then be too late.
Like N oah ,  1 seek to build an ark  against the day when the flood 
com es .140 Unlike N oah ,  I do  not expect to be a round  to use it. But 
o thers  will.
139 “ So long as we lack a clearly defined goal of national purpose, to which all are 
prepared to give allegiance, so long shall we remain within a rigid structure with 
chafing irritations; and the fault here lies ‘not in our stars but in ourselves'. A key 
to change itself, a symbol of liberation, would not necessarily mean its use; that 
awaits a consensus on the goal to be postulated” . Rand, Canada 1867-1967, 45 
CAN. BAR REV. 392 (1967).
140 Cf. G EN ESIS V.
